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Balancing Regulation and Rights in
Venezuela’s Media War
MOLLY CARNEY1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE VIOLENT PHOTOGRAPH BAN
On Friday, August 13, 2010, the front page of prominent
Venezuelan newspaper, El Nacional, featured a photograph of piled-up
bloody bodies at an overcrowded Caracas morgue.2 The graphic photo
depicted about a dozen dead bodies, many naked, lying on stretchers
and the floor.3 It accompanied a story about Venezuela’s rise in violent
crime, and in particular, the country’s high homicide rates.4 Another
opposition newspaper, Tal Cual, republished the photograph the
following Monday.5
Government actors responded quickly. The National
Ombudsman’s Office claimed that the photograph unduly upset children
and adolescents.6 Venezuelan police officers searched the El Nacional
newspaper office, allegedly in order to gain more information as to
when the photo was actually taken.7 President Hugo Chávez called the
photo “journalistic pornography.”8
The Tuesday after the photo was published, August 17, 2010, a
Caracas court banned all of the nation’s newspapers from publishing
1. Attorney, Chicago, Illinois; J.D. (2012), Washington University in St. Louis School of
Law; B.A. (2009), Northwestern University. I wish to thank Professor Frances Foster for her
invaluable guidance and encouragement.
2. See Dan Molinski, Grisly Photo Stirs Venezuela Voters, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2010),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703579804575441921817476204.html; Simon
Romero, Venezuela, More Deadly than Iraq, Wonders Why, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2010),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/americas/23venez.html?pagewanted=1;
Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB.,
http://laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=10717&ArticleId=363622 (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
3. Romero, supra note 2.
4. Id. See infra notes 159163 and accompanying text (citing Venezuela’s high homicide
rates).
5. See Molinski, supra note 2.
6. See Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 2.
7. Venezuelan Police Search Newspaper Office, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB.,
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=363737&CategoryId=10717 (last visited Nov. 22,
2010).
8. See Molinski, supra note 2.

273

274

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:273

violent photographs for the next thirty days.9 The court partially
reversed its ruling on Thursday, August 19, 2010, limiting the ban to the
two newspapers that had run the photo.10 Each ruling asserted that a ban
was a necessary measure to protect the nation’s children from moral and
psychological harm and to protect the nation’s safety.11
Voices on both sides of the debate characterized the photo and
court rulings as political moves in advance of upcoming legislative
elections.12 The two newspapers that published the photograph are
known voices of opposition to President Chávez.13 Chávez maintained
that the photo, which had actually been taken eight months before, was
a scare tactic by the opposition to attract voters for the elections.14 The
opposition papers and Western news outlets portrayed the ban as not
only a political move to silence them before the elections, but also as an
infringement of free expression.15 Following the court ban, El Nacional
featured the word “CENSURADO” (“CENSORED”) in place of a
front-page photo accompanied by the headline, “[t]hey’re prohibiting
publishing images and news about violence.”16 The text further
maintained that the paper would have published a photo of a father
crying for his murdered son but for the recent censorship.17 Venezuelan
media members such as Tal Cual’s editor, Teodoro Petkoff, publicly
criticized the ban.18 International news organizations were highly critical
9. Id. See also Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 2
(“For the next four weeks, no newspaper, magazine or weekly of the country can publish images
that are violent, bloody, grotesque, whether about crime or not.” The court planned to issue a
more definitive ruling a month later, on September 17.).
10. Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Venezuela, PRESS REFERENCE, http://www.pressreference.com/Uz-Z/Venezuela.html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2010). El Nacional is considered Venezuela’s “second most important
newspaper” after the slightly more conservative El Universal. Although the paper supported
Chávez in the 1998 presidential election, its political views have since moved towards the left.
Tal Cual, a tabloid founded in 2000 by leftist politician, former Cabinet member, one-time
guerilla, and journalist Teodoro Petkoff may be “the most visually intriguing in the crowded
Caracas scene.”
14. Molinski, supra note 2.
15. Carlos Lauria, Venezuelan Censorship Over Morgue Photo is Selective, COMM. TO
PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Aug. 20, 2010, 4:10 PM), http://cpj.org/blog/2010/08/venezuelancensorship-over-morgue-photos-is-select.php.
16. Molinski, supra note 2; see also Rory Carroll, Venezuela Ban on Violent Images Fuels
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
18,
2010),
available
at
Censorship
Row,
THE
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/18/venezuela-violent-images-censorship (running the
word “Censored” in the place of photographs is a protest tactic used in Venezuela during its
1950s dictatorship).
17. Id.
18. Id. (Petkoff argued that the ban was a “clearly political” act “in the face of what he sees
as the irresponsible conduct of the government with regard to the violence that is besetting
Venezuela.” He further claimed “Tal Cual has never engaged in sensationalism on the subject of
crime. “It was foreseeable,” according to Petkoff, that the Chávez administration would “kill the
messenger” in the media rather than “pay attention to the message.”).
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of the court’s ruling, maintaining that the ban constituted censorship
blocking freedom of speech.19 For example, the National Journalists
Association claimed, “[a] noble cause such as the protection of minors
is being used as an excuse to silence the media.”20
This article argues that the “media war” between the Chávez
government and opposition voices, ongoing during Chávez’s fourteen
years as President, is a double-edged sword. 21 While the Chávez
government and its supporters consistently portrayed media regulations
as necessary protections, privately owned opposition media and many
international organizations condemned them as threats to freedoms of
speech and information.22 An action such as the violent photo ban,
which could be considered a battle in the media war, can be framed
distinctively according to each conflicting viewpoint.23 In this media
war, however, a clear “win” by either side would be detrimental to the
public. Therefore, this Article proposes that a nuanced balancing
approach best resolves the conflict between regulation and rights.
Looking forward, this Article provides a theoretical framework for
assessing post-Chávez media regulation in Venezuela.
Part II discusses the Chávez government’s position in support of
media regulations, such as the violent photo ban. Avowed commitment
to Bolivarian Socialism and condemnation of private media ownership
by Chávez and his supporters underlie media restriction. Two main
objectives provide further justification for media regulation. First, the
Venezuelan legal framework consistently calls for the protection of
children. Second, threats by political opposition to government and
social stability necessitated preservation of national security. The
government and its supporters relied upon these objectives to
19. See, e.g., Molinski, supra note 2 (for example, news sources such as the B.B.C. and
Wall Street Journal framed the ban as “censorship” while international organizations such as the
Committee to Protect Journalists and the National Journalists issued statements condemning the
ban).
20. Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 2 (The
Association also expressed concern that the ban would “create self-censorship” in the affected
media outlets.).
21. This article focuses on Chávez’s interactions with the private media from his election in
1999 until the end of his third presidential term in October 2012. See Venezuela’s Media War,
B.B.C. NEWS (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2827273.stm
(introducing the concept of the "media war). Chávez was re-elected to another six-year
presidential term in October 2012, but he passed away after an ongoing struggle with cancer on
March 5, 2013. See Chávez Celebrates Re-election in Venezuela, B.B.C. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2012)
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19867445; Iconic Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez Dies, B.B.C. NEWS, (Mar. 6, 2013), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-21679053.
22. See, e.g., Chris Kraul, Hugo Chavez Targets Venezuelan Media, L.A. TIMES (July 22,
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/22/world/fg-venez-censor22.
23. Romero, supra note 2 (“The debate over the morgue photograph published by El
Nacional is intensifying, evolving into a broader discussion over the government’s efforts to
clamp down on the news outlets it does not control.”).
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substantiate the violent photograph ban.
Part III examines the role of media regulation in Venezuela from
the perspective of Chávez’s opposition. According to the opposition
position, restrictions upon the press threatened rights and unjustifiably
exceeded the government’s role. Privately owned media sources and
international organizations tended to support this position and demand
limits on Chávez’s regulation of the media.
The opposition
characterized measures against, and restrictions on, the press, such as
the violent photograph ban, as dangerous threats to the freedoms of
expression and information.
Part IV analyzes the competing positions discussed in Parts II and
III. Going forward, post-Chávez, Venezuela’s public interest must be
the crucial consideration, as the nation is plagued by crime and
economic difficulty. Contemporary international coverage of the media
war and frameworks for analyzing the media fail to focus on the
priorities of the people and of political pluralism. Emphasizing one
extreme to the exclusion of the other in the media war endangers the
public good. Therefore, analysis of the Venezuelan media war requires a
balance between the two positions. Since the current frameworks fail to
adequately account for both reasonable regulation and rights protection,
this article proposes a novel theoretical model that balances each
alongside the needs of the public. Applying the balancing approach to
the violent photo ban displays this approach’s superiority.
Finally, Part V concludes that the balancing approach should be
used to address future media regulation in Venezuela and other nations.
By taking into account the competing objectives in the media war and
averting unfettered control by either side, this approach will best uphold
the public good.
II. REGULATING FOR THE PEOPLE:
THE CHÁVEZ GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE
During Chávez’s time in office, his administration and supporters
consistently cited a number of objectives regarding creating and
upholding media regulation. An introduction to the aims of Chávez’s
Bolivarian Socialism and the contrasting concentration of private media
ownership illustrates the fundamental government concerns underlying
the use of regulation. In presenting the Chávez administration’s
perspective, this part focuses upon two further objectives of regulation:
protecting children and preserving national security.24 The court issuing
the violent photograph ban and the government’s defense cited these
24. Other possible objectives include disseminating cultural values, avoiding propaganda
and hate speech, protecting public health, and moral concerns. See Angel Luis Olivera Soto, Prior
Restraints in Venezuela’s Social Responsibility on Radio and Television Act: Are They Justified?,
40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 401, 402 (2008).
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concerns, which recur in Venezuela’s legal framework.25 From the
perspective of the Chávez regime, socialist and people-centered
objectives justified restrictions such as the violent photo ban.
A. Promotion of Bolivarian Socialism & Reduction
of Private Media Ownership
The historical development of Chávez’s strained relationship with
the private media provides some initial insight into his actions. The
Venezuelan government has long regulated the media, alternately
creating and eliminating restrictions.26 While a few past presidents
enjoyed friendlier relationships with the media,27 the “war” between
Chávez and the media was neither directly attributable nor novel to the
Chávez administration.28 The relationship between the administration
and private media evolved throughout Chávez’s fourteen-year
presidency.29 During election times and his presidency, Chávez relied
upon both public and private media to develop and maintain support and
identification with the people.30 Nevertheless, much of the privately25. See Venezuelan Police Search Newspaper Office, supra note 7; Molinksi, supra note 2.
26. For example, the 1939 Communications Law heavily restricted broadcast licensing,
creating a “virtual monopoly in the nation for those few broadcasters who were already lucky
enough to be in the air,” while the 1940 Telecommunications Law mandated state control over all
major communications matters. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Venezuela and the Media: The New
POLITICS,
GLOBAL
MEDIA
Paradigm,
LATIN
176, 183 (Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord, eds., 2002). Reductions in regulation and
liberalization of the broadcasting industry during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s prompted
minor increases in media pluralism; however, licenses were awarded mainly to political allies and
party members. Id. at 179.
27. Although President Carlos Andrés Pérez (President from 1974-79 and 1989-93)
occasionally conflicted with the media, “he knew how to play the game.” Id. at 181. Pérez had an
especially strong relationship with the Cisernos brothers—one of his first formal visits as
president was to the Venevision station, and he also fled to the station during a coup in 1990. Id.
28. During the 1960’s the Romulo Betancourt administration suspended constitutional
provisions, shut down the media outlets of communist parties, and pursued policies limiting
opposition media. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. The Luis Herrera Campins (President from
1979-84) administration often clashed with the media, and developed a new national
communication policy that reduced the power of private media outlets. Following his presidency,
at least one television network explicitly banned Herrera from its broadcasts. President Jaime
Lusinchi (President from 1984-89) generally communicated with the media through his private
secretary-mistress-eventual wife, a radio announcer. He publicly broke with the media by the end
of his presidency. Mayobre, supra note 26, at 180.
29. See BARRY CANNON, HUGO CHÁVEZ AND THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION: POPULISM
AND DEMOCRACY IN A GLOBALISED AGE, 129 (2009) (describing a progression in the
relationship between Chávez and the media from balance, to hostility, to seditious rebellion.
Although he had media support at the beginning, Chávez’s failure to continue providing
advertising income and subsidies led the private media to become “a space for consensus-seeking
amongst the opposition, and not between government and opposition as it had hitherto acted.”).
30. El Nacional and broadcasters including the Cisneros family supported Chávez’s first
campaign for president. GREGORY WILPERT, CHANGING VENEZUELA BY TAKING POWER: THE
HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE CHÁVEZ GOVERNMENT 206 (2007). During his daily Alo
Presidente show, Chávez regularly attended to individual complaints and requests for aid from
citizens. Id. at 48. VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHÁVEZ ERA: CLASS, POLARIZATION, AND
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owned media became increasingly anti-Chávez in its coverage.31 Chávez
supporters, on the other hand, claimed that the administration regulated
appropriately in the face of serious new challenges by the opposition,
and strived to improve the status of media for all people.32
Chávez’s attempted transformation of Venezuelan politics and
society further elucidated his relationship with the opposition and
private media. Chávez continuously emphasized class and social
concerns rather than simply pursuing conventional market-driven
economic objectives.33 His avowed commitment to a new form of
socialism, “Bolivarian Socialism,” motivated novel approaches to
government regulation and goals.34 Furthermore, Chávez attempted to
minimize privatization and business interests through the nationalization
of major industries and community delegation, demonstrating his
prioritization of the people.35 In pursuit of pluralism, the Chávez
administration also encouraged and facilitated the establishment of
grassroots groups and public communication outlets as mechanisms for
direct popular participation.36
Venezuela’s private media, on the other hand, remains one of the
nation’s few major privatized and capital-concentrated industries.37
CONFLICT (Steve Ellner & Daniel C. Hellinger eds., 2003).
31. Only in later elections did the media adopt anti-Chávez positions, publish incorrect poll
results and provide greater space to opposition candidates. Mayobre, supra note 26, at 183.
32. See Interview by Juan Reardon with Edwin Chirinos Duque, a professor at
the Bolivarian University of Venezuela in Merida, and a supporter of Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez, and interview with Maria Perez, member of Acción Democrática, or Democratic
Action (AD), an anti-Chavez political party (June 30, 2011),
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6314 (presenting a dialogue between two Venezuelan
political activists). Duque stated “[t]he updating of technologies, the launching of numerous local,
national, and regional radio, television, and internet-based medias has [sic] succeeded in breaking
the hegemonic communicational barriers imposed by the global elite.” Id.
33. See STEVE ELLNER, RETHINKING VENEZUELA POLITICS: CLASS, CONFLICT, AND THE
CHÁVEZ PHENOMENON 5 (2008). Since his last popular election, Chávez remained wellsupported, especially by lower classes. Id.
34. Id. at 118, 171. See also IAIN BRUCE, THE REAL VENEZUELA: MAKING SOCIALISM IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2008). (discussing the transition from democratic to socialist rhetoric,
particularly after Chávez’s 2005 announcement that he was implementing twenty-first century
socialism). For more insight into Chávez’s objectives and actions, see Blog de Hugo Chávez,
CHÁVEZ.ORG.VE (last visited Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.Chávez.org.ve; CORREO DEL ORINOCO
(English Edition), available at http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/english-edition/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011) (government-controlled, pro-Chávez newspaper).
35. ELLNER, supra note 33, at 118.
36. See ELLNER, supra note 33, at 177-94 (discussing government promotion of popular
participation through grassroots and state-facilitated groups like Bolivarian Circles). See also Eva
Golinger, Documents Reveal Multimillion Dollar Funding to Journalists and Media in Venezuela,
VENEZUELANALYSIS (July 15, 2010), http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5495 (“Not only do
media and journalists in Venezuela have a near-absolute freedom of expression, during the past
decade, under the Chávez administration, hundreds of new media outlets, many communitybased, have been created in order to foster and expand citizens’ access to media. Community
media was prohibited under prior governments, which only gave broadcasting access to
corporations willing to pay big money to maintain information monopolies in the country.”).
37. See WILPERT, supra note 30, at 206.
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Influential businessmen, large corporations, and wealthy families own
the majority of the industry and possess a substantial market share in
Venezuelan media distribution.38 For example, the immense global
corporation, Grupo Cisneros, owns not only Venevision, Venezuela’s
leading television network, but also holds interests ranging from
entertainment and telecommunications companies to Los Leones del
Caracas, Venezuela’s championship baseball team.39
From the perspective of the Chávez administration, the privatelyowned media, controlled by a few powerful and wealthy individuals,
did not represent the citizenry’s rights and desires nor accurately report
the news. Media owners, while utilizing their power to shape public
perception and policy, are likely to serve personal property and
privilege interests rather than the needs of the people.40 Eleazar Diaz
Rangel, the editor-in-chief of Ultimas Noticias, Venezuela’s highestcirculating newspaper, has stated, “What’s not published in Venezuela
is what media owners don’t want published.”41
Political polarization defined the divisions between the private
media and Chávez. Due to the relative lack of interest and competing
factions in greater Venezuelan society, private media may be the “only
solid base of power of the old elite,” which is itself reliant upon racism
38. Private media possesses the greatest market share of Venezuela’s media distribution—
private ownership (including family, widely held, and employee-owned) of Venezuela’s top five
daily newspapers is 100% and top five television stations is 75%. Simeon Djankov et. al, Who
Owns the Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341 (2003) (analyzing the concentration of media ownership
and “media freedom” based upon journalists jailed, media outlets closed, journalists jailed, and
internet restrictions, measured alongside controls such as GDP, autocracy, political and economic
freedom, and health outcomes). See also Mark Weisbrot and Tara Ruttenberg, Television in
Venezuela: Who Dominates the Media?, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, (Dec.
2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/2010_12_venezuela_media.pdf
(finding market domination by private channels and estimating that over 94% of television
viewed by Venezuelans is not pro-government).
39. CISNEROS GROUP, http://www.cisneros.com/Home (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). The
Cisneros Group, which is owned and controlled by a Venezuelan family with longtime access to
the Presidential Palace and a history of supporting democratic candidates, has now expanded its
communications business to approximately forty countries and is headquartered in South Florida.
Gerardo Reyes, Self-Censorship in Latin America, 11 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1 (2002). See Naomi
NATION
(Feb.
13,
2003),
Klein, Venezuela’s
Media
Coup,
THE
http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2003/02/venezuelas-media-coup.
(“Venezuela’s
private
television stations are owned by wealthy families with serious financial stakes in defeating
Chávez. Venevision, the most-watched network, is owned by Gustavo Cisneros, a mogul dubbed
the ‘joint venture king’ by the New York Post. The Cisneros Group has partnered with many top
US brands-from AOL and Coca-Cola to Pizza Hut and Playboy-becoming a gatekeeper to the
Latin American market.”).
40. Id.
41. Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations,
“What’s Not Published in Venezuela Is What Media Owners Don’t Want Published,”
VENEZUELANALYSIS (Dec. 13, 2010), http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5854media war (As
one pro-Chávez sociologist stated, “What has developed is an anchor between citizens and media
outlets that reinforce their existing political opinions . . . As such, the media has a dedicated
audience that is politically and ideologically aligned but, on the whole, uninformed.”).
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and classism.42 Moreover, many media leaders “promulgate a pro-U.S.
[sic], market friendly, liberal democratic agenda” that tends to be more
consistent with the aims of Chávez’s opposition than that of his
Bolivarian Revolution.43 These incompatibilities resulted in a dynamic
and increasingly combative relationship between Chávez and the private
media.44
Overall, from the Chávez administration’s perspective, the power
and influence of Venezuela’s private media threatened the development
of a new socialist society. Chávez’s reaction to the violent photograph
reflected these concerns, as he declared “The country demands respect .
. . The publication of this image just shows desperation, because they
are trying to sabotage the Bolivarian Revolution by any means.”45
B. Protection of Children
The court issuing the violent photograph ban presented
psychological and moral protection of children as its chief
justification.46 From the government’s perspective, the graphic nature of
these particular photographs (naked bodies at a morgue), in conjunction
with its casual exhibition (displayed on newsstands or by home
delivery), posed irreparable harm to children.47 Likewise, the
42. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 205. As the formerly powerful elite loses campaigns and
other bases of power, they are desperate for restoration of the status quo. Id. at 206. The old elite
has used the media to gain middle class support by such methods as campaigns taking “advantage
of the latent racism and classism in Venezuela culture.” Id. at 20. See also CANNON, supra note
29, at 63 (2009) (discussing the private media’s employment of race- and class-based fears in
mobilizing the middle and upper classes against proposed 2001 enabling laws); Ellner and
Hellinger, supra note 30, at 20 (discussing both racism of the opposition and Chávez’s
disproportionately effective communication towards poor and uneducated classes).
43. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 126.
44. See Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32. Pro-Chávez voice Duque declares “a pool
of television channels and radio stations, in addition to their internet-based allies, go about
shamelessly lying, experimenting with all of the ideological venoms produced in U.S. and
European labs.” Id. “Their objective is to keep their follows following, founded in a submissive
mindset, individual chains which are stronger than real, physical chains. If one takes a look at the
programming on Venezuelan television, a majority of shows are based on fascist, right wing
content that advances their political interests.” Id. “Everything these media elite produce is
created in the image of their economic interests, including their disgraceful attempts to coerce
leaders and secure electoral victories against parties and leaders they disagree with.” Id. “The
corporate media is a supranational entity that uses threats and manipulation to guarantee its
interests are defended, overriding many of the most fundamental national judicial mechanisms.”
Id.
45. See Golinger, supra note 36 (“Today, corporate media outlets and their journalists use
communications power to publicly promote the overthrow of the Venezuelan government. The
owners and executives of these media corporations form part of the Venezuelan elite that, under
the reigns of Washington, ran the country for forty years before Chávez won the presidency in
1998.”).
46. See Molinski, supra note 2.
47. “Imagine you’re walking on the street with your children and you pass a newsstand with
today’s papers displayed as usual and the front pages clearly visible to all who pass by. But to
your horror, today’s national daily has an almost full-page graphic image of dead, bloodied
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Venezuelan legal framework emphasizes the protection of children as
an important public concern. The Chávez administration often
employed this concern in creating and defending regulation.
The most significant foundation of Venezuela’s media regulatory
structure, the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television
(“Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión,” hereinafter
RESORTE), uses child protection as a purpose and guide in establishing
its broadcasting requirements.48 While this law does not expressly
target newspapers such as those that published the violent photograph, it
demonstrates the fundamental moral justification relied upon by the
Chávez government. The law’s fundamental purposes include
“protection of the children and adolescents” and “integral education of
the children.”49 Likewise, the government maintained that RESORTE
was needed for “the development of children and adolescents who
constitute the group of society most susceptible to influence.”50
RESORTE mandates strict requirements for children’s
programming. For example, television and radio messages must qualify
as “directed at children” for at least eighteen hours per day.51 RESORTE
presented the government with one major means by which to protect
children, while also demonstrating the perceived importance of this
objective.
Further pronouncements regarding children’s rights encouraged
the use of government regulation to protect children. Venezuela’s
Organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents (LOPNA)
guarantees children and adolescents certain rights and protections from
the State, society, and families.52 LOPNA places affirmative duties upon
media outlets and the government alongside negative restrictions upon
potentially harmful material when creating and broadcasting children’s
programming.53
Additionally, Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution
articulates a national commitment to child protection, education, and
bodies piled on top of each other in the local morgue. Every newsstand you walk by has the same
image, even repeated in several national and local papers. Your children are forced to see this
with no warning.” Golinger, supra note 36.
48. See Soto, supra note 24, at 465. The Venezuelan law for broadcast media, RESORTE,
was enacted in December 2004. Id. RESORTE regulates all aspects of Venezuelan radio and
television programming, production, and viewership. Id. See also LEY RESORTE,
http://www.leyresorte.gob.ve/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
49. Id. at 442.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 431–35. All television channels are required to show child-friendly programming
at certain specified times under “all users” and “supervised” blocks, along with developing childspecific programs. Id. These provisions are strictly enforced. Id.
52. Ley Orgánica para la Protección del Niño y del Adolescente, La Gaceta Oficial N° 5.266
(Oct.
2,
1998)
(Venez.)
hereinafter
LOPNA,
available
at
http://www.ventanalegal.com/leyes/ley_organica_proteccion_nino_adolescente.htm (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010).
53. See, e.g., LOPNA arts. 70–73 (providing for affirmative obligations); Id. art. 75
(prohibiting information and/or images that “promote or incite violence”).
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development.54 Regarding media, Article 58 reads “[c]hildren and
adolescents have the right to receive adequate information for purposes
of their overall development.”55 In addition, international laws
specifically expound upon the children-centered aspirations of the
domestic framework.56
Venezuelan courts have also used the protection of children as a
basis for making certain media-related decisions. For example, in
February 2007, a child welfare court57 fined Tal Cual author Laureano
Marquez and editor Teodoro Petkoff a total of almost $50,000 for
addressing a satirical editorial letter to President Chávez’s daughter.58
The letter first appeared on the front page of the opposition newspaper
in November 2005.59 It asked Chávez’s nine-year old daughter Rosinés
to request that her father “soften his attacks on his political
opponents.”60 The government prosecuted the newspaper on the child’s
behalf.61
Citing LOPNA and the UNCRC, the court asserted several
54. The newest Constitution of Venezuela [Constitución de la República Bolivariana de
Venezuela] [hereinafter Constitution] was adopted on December 20, 1999. See Constitución de la
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, available at http://venezuelanalysis.com/constitution. The
1999 Constitution was the result of a long process: a popular referendum to ask the people if they
wanted a new Constitution, the calling of a Constitutional Assembly, and approval as a final
referendum by popular vote. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. The country was renamed the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at this point, signifying Chávez’s new objectives. Id. Examples
of child-centered language include Title III, Chapter V, entitled “Social and Family Rights,”
which discusses familial rights and responsibilities. Article 78 provides for legal rights and
recourse: “Children and adolescents are full legal persons and shall be protected . . . The State
shall promote their progressive incorporation into active citizenship, and shall create a national
guidance system for the overall protection of children and adolescents.” Constitution art. 78.
55. Constitution, supra note 54, art. 58.
56. For example, Venezuela became a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990. CRC’s Article 17 addresses mass media, delineating State
obligations such as encouraging “the development of appropriate guidelines for the protection of
the child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being.” Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25, art. 17(e) (Sept. 2, 1990),
[hereinafter CRC] available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (“State Parties
recognize the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that the child has
access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources,
especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and
physical and mental health.”). Additionally, Article 13 provides that children “shall have the right
to freedom of expression.” CRC art. 13.
57. In Spanish, the court, which is specifically intended for cases involving children and
adolescents, is called the “Tribunal de Protección del Niño y Adolescente de la Circunscripción
Judicial del Estaso Lara.” A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities
for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 91 (2008),
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/09/18/decade-under-ch-vez.
The
1999
Constitution
established the court with the premise that a separate court would best protect children’s rights
and development. Id.
58. Id. at 90 (citing Case No. KP02-V-2006-00226). Tal Cual is one of the newspapers that
published the violent photograph. See supra note 13.
59. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 90.
60. Id.
61. Id.

2013]

Balancing Regulation and Rights

283

rationales related to child protection, including the child’s honor and
reputation, privacy, family life, and social development.62 The judge
found in particular that the column had “seriously compromised” the
rights established by Article 65 of LOPNA.63 The judge also reasoned
that the letter harmed the father-child relationship because the satirical
letter “incited disrespect for symbols of the nation and for her father,
since, regardless of the office he holds, he deserves his children’s
respect, and a medium of communication should not encourage a young
girl to despise her father, or involve a girl in political argument
concerning the post that he holds, nor does the girl need to have direct
knowledge of the political objections of the citizens . . . .”64
Overall, the child-centered nature of the Venezuelan legal
framework demonstrates an avowed commitment to protecting,
educating, and positively influencing the development of children. In
this way, the Chávez government justified media regulation as
necessary to protect the rights of a particularly vulnerable segment of
society by preventing the dissemination of potentially destructive
information.
C. Preservation of National Security
Chávez supporters characterized El Nacional and Tal Cual’s
publication of the violent photograph as just one opposition attack in an
ongoing “media war” against the Chávez government and its citizenry.65
In Chávez’s view, the private media’s powerful influence during
Venezuela’s recent history of political and social unrest required
restrictions.66 In particular, media played an essential role throughout
the tumultuous coup d’état in 2002, in which Chávez was removed from

62. Id. at 91.
63. Id at 91–92. See LOPNA, supra 52, art. 65. Protects children’s “right to honor,
reputation, self-image, private life, and family privacy, which may not be subject to arbitrary and
illegal interference.” The Article prohibits the publication of information that could affect a
child’s honor or privacy, especially those who are victims or perpetrators of crime. Id. The
judge’s rationale, however, was partially based on common sense: “there is no report to determine
how her rights were damaged, what were the disturbances in her family life, what was the harm
caused, but we know that it is so, since we have all been children. . . .” Id.
64. Id. at 91. “The judge concluded that the child’s rights to honor, peer-group relations,
family life, and social development had been gravely affected.” Id. at 92. Two days after the
article’s publication Chávez had discussed his daughter’s reaction to the article on his Aló
Presidente radio show, saying “She said to me: ‘Papi, it’s a lack of respect for the coat-of-arms.’
She didn’t complain about herself, but about the coat-of-arms, you see? How fantastic children
are! How fantastic children are to teach a lesson to those animals infesting the sewers!” Id. In
deciding the case two years later, the child welfare judge referenced this reaction, stating “it is
also evident, and follows from the [president’s] speeches on ‘Hello President’ that neither the
father, nor the child herself, agrees with the publication.” Id. (internal quotes omitted).
65. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 2 (“The government says the photograph was meant to
undermine it, not to inform the public.”).
66. See supra note 30 (discussing the private media’s turn against Chávez).
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office for forty-seven hours.67 Privately owned, opposition-supporting
media outlets provided constant publicity in support of an oppositionorganized march demanding Chávez’s resignation.68 Chávez, detained
by the opposition, agreed to step down temporarily from the presidency,
but refused to resign.69 The media, however, led the public to believe
that he had indeed resigned.70 When Chávez returned to power two days
later, privately owned television stations omitted the news, instead
airing the film Pretty Woman and Tom and Jerry cartoons.71
Following the 2002 coup, the war between Chávez and the media
continued. For example, several privately owned media outlets
supported a general strike shutting down Venezuela’s oil industry in
protest of the Chávez government.72 During the sixty-seven-day long
strike, these stations broadcasted approximately 700 pro-strike, antiChávez advertisements per day.73
Media-promoted unrest threatened not only the Chávez
administration’s stability, but also social stability.74 Both publicly and
privately owned outlets were targeted by violence related to the media
war.75 Even when attacks targeted opposition media, the government
strived to preserve the peace and condemn such actions.76 Furthermore,
67. See Klein, supra note 39.
68. El Nacional and Tal Cual, the newspapers that published the violent photo, were two of
the predominant print media sources providing highly partisan coverage in the time surrounding
the 2002 media coup. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 69. “[I]n the days leading up to
the April coup, Venevision, RCTV, Globovision and Televen replaced regular programming with
relentless anti-Chávez speeches, interrupted only for commercials calling on viewers to take to
the streets: ‘Not one step backwards. Out! Leave Now!’ The ads were sponsored by the oil
industry, but the stations carried them free, as ‘public service announcements.’” Klein, supra note
39.
69. A counter-march in support of president/clash between two sides occurred also. Soto,
supra note 24, at 407. Chávez finally stepped down at the urging of high forces.
70. Klein, supra note 39. A transitional government was put in place, led by Pedro Carmona
as interim President, but a counter-coup by the pro-Chávez Presidential Guard returned Chávez to
power within the next two days. Id.
71. Id.
72. The oil industry, which has been struggling in recent years, is the foundation of
Venezuela’s economy. See Romero, supra note 2. Lost economic activity during this particular
strike, which lasted for sixty-four days, cost the country approximately $14 billion. Bernardo
Alvarez Herrera, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, Political Conflict and Freedom of
Expression in Venezuela, ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L., 565, 567 (2005).
73. Id. See Klein, supra note 39.
74. Herrera, supra note 72, at 567.
75. For example, drive-by shooters injured two workers at the regional branch of ViveTV, a
state-owned, community-based television channel. Tamara Pearson, Shooting Attack on
Venezuelan Community Television Station ViveTV, VENEZUELANALYSIS (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6395 (“Vive’s programming consists of cultural and education
shows. 90% of Vive’s content is created outside the studio, unlike the other state owned station,
VTV, which is highly studio based. Vive is known for its grassroots, community-based & created
coverage. It has also organized tens of thousands of media production workshops around
country.”).
76. See, e.g., Rory Carroll, Venezuelan TV Station is Stormed by Supporters of Hugo
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
4,
2009),
available
at
Chávez,
THE
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the violent effects of the media war often reached the general
population. Throughout the 2002 coup, murders, injuries, and looting
endangered public safety.77 As the Chávez administration struggled with
societal crime, violent and disturbing imagery in the press challenged
stability instead of promoting it.78
From the perspective of the Chávez administration, selectivity and
misinformation in the private media further challenged public
confidence in the government. Privately owned media sources accused
Chávez of implausible dealings ranging from commanding slum militias
to causing a major mudslide.79 They also misreported information such
as the results of public opinion polls and omitted important events such
as the launching of the first Venezuelan satellite, named the Simon
Bolivar.80 Such selective releases of information and deliberate
misinformation provoked future unrest against the government and
provided the rationale for the need to restrain the media.
As with the protection of children, the 1999 Constitution
consistently calls for the preservation of national security.81 For
example, Article 322 maintains, “[n]ational security is an essential
competence and responsibility of the State, based on the overall
development of the latter, and its defense is the responsibility of all
Venezuelans.”82 Societal responsibility for preserving order should be
shared by public and private entities.83 Similarly, RESORTE repeatedly
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/04/venezuela-tv-station-armed-raid
(Individual
supporters of Chávez stormed the Globovision office, armed with tear gas and handguns. Interior
minister, Tareck El Aissami, asserted that the attacks were not the result of government influence:
“We condemn this attack energetically and reject this type of violent action against Globovision.
We don’t accept that violence is the instrument to solve our differences.”).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Reggae Artist Defies Ban on Violent Images, FREEMUSE (Aug. 24, 2010),
http://www.freemuse.org/sw38948.asp. The music video “Rotten Town” was released just after
the violent photo ban was issued, when it still applied to all violent images. Id. The video, by
Venezuelan reggae singer Onechot, portrays an innocent child struck down by a stray bullet and
his blood seeping through Caracas’ streets. The video has spread rapidly across the Internet
despite government protests. Id.
79. Opposition in the media has accused Chávez of “plotting assassinations and bombings,
sponsoring foreign terrorist organizations and leading anti-democratic movements across the
hemisphere, and commanding an army of clandestine guerilla groups and slum militias.” Soto,
supra note 24. Commentaries and editorials “appeared to blame Chávez for just about every
problem in Venezuela, from the Vargas mudslide to the coup.” WILPERT, supra note 30, at 205.
80. Id. at 24 (regarding inaccurate reporting of public opinion polls); Map of Freedom in the
HOUSE
(2009),
World:
Venezuela,
FREEDOM
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009&country=7733 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010) (regarding media’s failure to report on satellite launch).
81. In fact, the seventh of its nine sections is entitled “National Security.” See Constitution,
supra note 54, art. 322–32.
82. Id. art. 322.
83. “National security is based on shared responsibility between the State and civil society
to implement the principles of independence, democracy, equality, peace, freedom, justice,
solidarity, promotion and conservation of the environment and affirmation of human rights. . . .
The principle of shared responsibility applies to the economic, social, political, cultural,
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asserts national security objectives, declaring that “content
dissemination is governed by the public interest by virtue of its
importance and impact on social, cultural, political, economic and
national security.”84 These references to national security provide
authority and an ideological ground for security-based media
restrictions.
According to the Chávez administration and its supporters, this
history of threats by Venezuela’s privately owned media towards the
government, and against social stability, validated the use of
regulations. Venezuelan ambassador to the United States, Bernardo
Alvarez Herrera, framed the government’s stability concern: “What is
the proper role of the state when it is faced with a media whose power is
roughly equal to that of that state, and when that power is used actively
to destabilize a democratically elected government?”85 Discussing the
violent photograph ban, Chávez stressed the potentially destabilizing
nature of the battle, stating, “[t]he opposition have been working on a
mix of plans, so that by today we would have been in a state of chaos in
the country . . . Nonetheless, it seems as though their plans haven’t
worked and they are desperate now, so they are trying to generate
reactions from the people.”86
In sum, the Chávez government justified media regulations with its
objectives of promoting Bolivarian socialism, protecting children, and
preserving national security. In light of the needs of the Venezuelan
people, goals of the government, and the national legal framework, such
regulations may be necessary. According to the government
perspective, reasonable regulations like the violent photograph ban
benefited the people and advanced the aims of the Bolivarian
Revolution.
III. ENDANGERING RIGHTS: THE OPPOSITION ARGUMENT
AGAINST MEDIA REGULATION
Critics of the violent photograph ban characterized it as an

geographical, environmental and military spheres.” Constitution, supra note 54, art. 326.
84. LEY RESORTE, supra note 48, art. 3. The government is responsible for “[t]he protection
of national security.” RESORTE art. 6(2).
85. Herrara, supra note 72, at 565–66 (Herrara’s speech to the International Law Student’s
Association advanced the government’s view on political conflict and freedom of expression in
Venezuela, advocating that freedom of expression and the press are thriving in the nation.). See
also Soto, supra note 24, at 456 (“It is a vital interest of the state to protect its political stability
and prevent potential plots to overthrow its democratically elected government, and the political
unrest in Venezuela, combined with the antagonistic role the media has played in it” can justify
reasonable restrictions. The restrictions on freedom of expression imposed by RESORTE are
justified based on the security of the nation.).
86. Eva Golinger, Media Pornography, VENEZUELANALYSIS, (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5581.
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infringement upon rights of the people and press.87 While the Chávez
government emphasized the need for regulations like the ban,
opposition voices in privately owned media sources and supportive
international organizations portrayed such measures as unwarranted
risks to rights exceeding the government’s authority.88 According to this
position in the media war, measures silencing opposition in the media
threatened freedoms of expression and information.
A. Measures Against the Press
The opposition cited government action against and influence over
the press as a threat to rights. According to the opposition, the Chávez
administration unreasonably targeted privately owned media with
extreme regulation and punishment. Chávez’s stated concerns about
media ownership conflicted with growing government control over both
public and private media.
The opposition suggested that targeted attacks against the media
such as imprisonment, sanctions, and shutdown of news sources unduly
silenced any challenges to Chávez.89 From this perspective, these attacks
promoted self-censorship in all privately owned media, damaged the
well-being and business of targeted individuals and entities, and
threatened individual rights.90
The government punished many individual members of the
media.91 For instance, Oswaldo Álvarez Paz, an opposition leader and
former state governor who writes columns for El Nacional, was jailed
and prosecuted in February 2010 for publicly claiming that Chávez
87. See Venuzela's Media War, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
88. One strong representation of the “opposition” is the Democratic Unity Table (MUD), the
political coalition formed in preparation of the 2012 Presidential election, and the party of twotime Presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski. See UNIDAD VENEZUELA,
http://www.unidadvenezuela.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). See also ALLAN R. BREWERCARIAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ AUTHORITARIAN
EXPERIMENT (2010) (Chávez opponent argues that the undemocratically enacted 1999
Constitution has led to the dismantling of Venezuelan democracy.).
89. See, e.g., Journalist Committee Denounces Repressive Measures by Chávez, SOUTHERN
PULSE
(Feb.
23,
2011),
http:www.southernpulse.com/_webapp_3834678?Journalist_committee_denounces_repressive_m
easures_by_Chávez (citing a report by the Venezuelan Journalists Protection Committee
criticizing overly “aggressive” government regulations); WILPERT, supra note 30, at 33 (claiming
that while the Chávez government did explicitly censor as feared by the opposition, the
opposition protests intimidation of the private mass media occurring through methods such as
fines and broadcast licensing).
90. See Soto, supra note 24.
91. See, e.g., Ender Ramírez Padrino, CNP Repudia Ataques Contra Periodistas y Medios
de Comunicación, EL NACIONAL, (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://www.elnacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/226286/Nación/CNP-repudia-ataques-contraperiodistas-y-medios-de-comunicación. (National Committee to Protect Journalists complains of
government silencing of journalists and lack of access to information, specifically repudiating
attacks on LIVE TV host Zulia Fe y Alegria.).
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supports Basque and Colombian terrorists.92 Similarly, columnist
Francisco Perez was jailed in June 2010 after accusing a local mayor of
nepotism in a newspaper editorial.93 A federal court sentenced Perez,
who had forty years of journalism experience, to three years and nine
months in prison and fined over $18,000 (USD).94 The court relied on
insult laws, questioned by the opposition, which provide for penalties
including imprisonment, fines, disclosure of private information,95 and
the denial of licenses.96 The court specifically relied upon an insult law
prohibiting “disrespectful expression toward government officials.”97
The Perez case represented a trend of punishing media members
with severe penalties defined by wide judicial discretion but strong
administrative influence.98 Such decisions appeared problematic because
they promoted fear of punishment while incentivizing selective selfcensorship.
From the opposition perspective, the shutdown of privately owned
television channels also indicated government impropriety. Following
the 2002 media coup, Chávez identified four major opposition channels
as the “four horsemen,” blaming them largely for the coup’s success.99
These channels became government targets. In 2007, the government
shut down RCTV Internacional, the most popular television channel in
92. See Roger Noriega, The Jailing of Oswaldo Álvarez Paz, FORBES, (Mar. 23,
2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/23/hugo-chavez-venezuela-oswaldo-alvarez-pazopinions-contributors-roger-noriega.html. Paz also acknowledged the existence of drug
trafficking in Venezuela. Id. He was charged with conspiracy, “public instigation of criminality”
and “spreading false information.” Id.
93. See Roy Greenslade, IFJ Condemns Jail Sentence on Venezuelan Columnist, GUARDIAN
(June 18, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2010/jun/18/press-freedomvenezuela.
94. Id. The International Federation of Journalists maintained, “it is a brutal, unacceptable
judgment with very few international precedents.” Id.
95. For example, in July 2005, the Office of the Attorney General used insult laws to justify
the investigation of major newspaper El Universal for an article that was critical of Chávez and
the judiciary. In November of the same year, an El Nacional writer was forced to hand over a tape
of interviews, with the government’s justification being that he had made them near the
presidential palace. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Venezuela (2009),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7088&year=2009. Id.
96. See, e.g., Freedom of the Press: Venezuela (2009), FREEDOM HOUSE,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7088&year=2009 (“In August,
the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) closed two FM radio stations for
operating without proper licenses. The closures were condemned in Venezuela and abroad as
politically motivated.”).
97. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57 at 65 (these laws were reformed in 2005 to
increase penalties for criminal defamation and libel).
98. See, e.g., Soto, supra note 24 (citing the deprival of freedom of expression rights by
some courts, often combined with the use of broad judicial discretion and a lack of strong
justification); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57 (discussing several court cases in which
harsh penalties were issued for journalists and referencing the vagueness of provisions as one
explanation for unduly harsh outcomes).
99. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57. The four horsemen were the channels
RCTV Internacional, Globovision, Venevision and Televen. Id.
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Venezuela, by denying renewal of its public license and forcing it to
move to subscriber cable.100 In early 2010, the Chávez administration
further ordered cable networks to stop broadcasting the channel, saying
it would lift the suspension only if RCTV agreed to comply with its
demands, for example, by agreeing to broadcast Chávez’s speeches.101
In June 2012, Guillermo Zuloaga, an owner of the television news
channel Globovision, fled the country after the government issued a
warrant for his arrest.102
The Chávez government also doled out penalties that the
opposition considered extreme. For example, in October 2011, the
National Commission on Telecommunications (CONATEL) fined
Globovision $2.16 million USD for its coverage of a prison riot.103
100. This was a highly unpopular decision condemned domestically and internationally.
WILPERT, supra note 30, at 232. See also Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32, at 232 (“In
Venezuela Freedom of Speech is of vital importance and it’s no secret to anyone that the closure
of our oldest running television channel, RCTV, had a huge impact on Venezuelan society. After
RCTV was closed, a large number of young people and other members of civil society raised
their voice, and continue to do so, on behalf of freedom of expression. From that moment on
people began to understand the importance of keeping themselves informed. Meanwhile, the
government has gone on to close numerous other means of communication, including
approximately 362 radio broadcasts and many other written media, though they maintain the
independent media outlets that they consider too dangerous to close because of the enormous
social backing and support they have – Globovision, for example.”). The government’s
perspective on the shutdown was that RCTV’s participation in the 2002 coup, oil industry
shutdown, and other regulatory violations, combined with the government’s discretionary power
over licensing, legally permitted and in fact obligated the closure. WILPERT, supra note 30, at
232.
101. See Anthony Mills, Venezuelan Student Killed in TV Protests, INT’L. PRESS INST. (Jan.
26, 2010), http://www.freemedia.at/site-services/singleview-master/4682/.
102. See Venezuela Orders Arrest of TV Owner Critical of Chávez, B.B.C. NEWS (June 12,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10300428; T.V. Channel Owner Arrested in Venezuela, U.S.A.
TODAY (June 12, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2012-06-venezuela-tvchannel_N.htm. The state prosecutor claimed that the warrants were related to business issues
with two car dealerships partially owned by the Zuloagas. Id. The opposition considered
Globovision to be its main channel, even though it could only be watched by people with cable or
an open signal source. Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32. In March 2013, Globovision
announced that it had accepted a buyout offer, blaming its financial difficulties upon regulations
by the Chávez government. Tamara Pearson, Venezuelan Opposition Channel Globovision to be
(Mar.
12,
2013),
Sold
after
Elections,
VENEZUELANALYSIS,
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/8201.
103. See AVN, Comisión de Medios de la AN avala decisión de Conatel de multar a
NACIONAL
(Oct.
18,
2011),
available
at
http://www.elGlobovisión,
EL
nacional.com/noticia/5628/16/Comisión-de-Medios-de-la-AN-avala-decisión-de-Conatel-demultar-a-Globovisión.htmlón-de-Medios-de-la-AN-avala-decisión-de-Conatel-de-multar-aGlobovisión.html; Juan Francisco Alonso, Globovisión Accuses Government at International
Courts, EL UNIVERSAL (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-ypolitica/111020/globovision-accuses-government-at-international-courts
(discussing
Globovision’s decision to appeal the fine to domestic and international courts); Tamara Pearson,
Venezuelan Opposition TV Globovision Fined for Manipulation, VENEZUELANALYSIS, (Oct. 19,
2011), http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6569. A gang at Venezuela’s El Rodeo Prison took
other prisoners hostage in June 2011. Id. CONATEL claimed that the station had created a
“situation of uncertainty and anxiety” by encouraging families to protest outside of the prison,
retransmitting the same interviews 269 times over four days, and showing footage of the
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Opposition coalition MUD called the fine a “disguised attempt to close
the channel,” while Venezuelan NGO Alianza por la Libertad de
Expresión (Alliance for Freedom of Expression) characterized the
penalty as “arbitrary” and “disproportionate.”104 Such attacks appeared
to be targeted against political opposition, and more specifically the four
horsemen.
The Chávez government argued that the publication of incendiary
pieces such as El Nacional’s violent photo fostered social instability,
but the pattern of violence challenged this proposition.105 Although
violence occurred against the media at large, this violence largely
targeted the privately owned opposition media.106 For example, in 2008
several opposition media members were subject to brutal attacks,
including a reporter, a photographer,107 the vice president of a daily
newspaper,108 and a news anchor.109 At times, Chávez called for such
attacks in the media, and indeed government officials executed some of
the attacks.110 Citizen protests against government restrictions also led to
violence. In January 2010, a student was killed and nine police officers
injured during protests against the government order to stop
broadcasting RCTV International.111 The imbalance of violence against
opposition media suggests that the Chávez media regulations may have
served a political role exceeding the government’s authority.
The opposition feared that the Chávez administration limited the
media in order to preserve its own political power rather than to protect
Venezuela’s citizenry. It blamed polarization in the press on
government control over the media and the selective use of sanctions

prisoner’s mothers. Id. CONATEL cited RESORTE Articles 27 and 29, which respectively
provide for a fine of up to 10% of income and/or the suspension of transmissions for “promoting
anxiety, disorder, or justifying crime.” Id. The penalty equaled about 7.5% of the station’s 2010
gross income. Id.
104. Id. See El Universal, Alliance for Freedom of Expression Rejects Fine on TV Channel,
EL UNIVERSAL (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-ypolitica/111020/alliance-for-freedom-of-expression-rejects-fine-on-tv-channel.
105. See supra Part II(B) (discussing threats to social stability).
106. See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 96 (“Violent attacks against the media such as
shootings and assaults occur regularly.”).
107. In July 2008, a reporter and photographer from opposition newspaper La Verdad were
assaulted by local officials while attempting to cover waste disposal practices. Id. The official
confiscated the journalists’ equipment and they were allegedly beaten and held for over two
hours. Id.
108. The vice president of the Caracas daily Reporte Diario de la Economia, Pierre Fould
Gerges, was murdered in Caracas on June 2, 2008. Id.
109. Two weeks after Gerges’ murder, news anchor, Javier Garcia, of the opposition channel
RCTV was found stabbed to death in his apartment. Id. Supposedly he had been robbed, but the
case was still being investigated at the end of 2008. Id.
110. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 72 (arguing that such attacks upon
individuals and social stability are generally not the fault of the journalists but instead
governmental actions).
111. See Mills, supra note 101.
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against opposition-supporting media.112 The government already
exercised strong influence over the public, not only through mediarelated policy, but also through publicly owned media sources.113
If this was a media war, not all of the media was the enemy—the
government chose which parts were. As of 2009, governmentcontrolled publications included a daily newspaper, a number of
television channels with national coverage, and Chávez’s daily radio
and television program (Aló Presidente), broadcasted on the Radio
Nacional network.114 The government further exercised control over
commercial broadcasting in a variety of ways.115 Most notable among
Chávez’s presidential powers over public access was the mandatory
broadcasting of cadenas, official announcements replacing scheduled
programming on all television channels.116 Overall, the government’s
media influence and selective sanctioning suggested the need for strong
counteracting voices.
Past use of media and policy buttressed the premise that Chávez
might attempt to defeat his political opposition through media control.
As he came to power and throughout his presidency, Chávez took
advantage of the media by gaining and retaining publicity in broadcasts
and articles using publicly owned media outlets.117 For example, in the
child welfare court case discussed in Part II, Tal Cual’s editor, Petkoff,
argued that Chávez himself was responsible for making his daughter
112. Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32 (“The polarization of the means of
communication was inevitable; with a great majority of media now controlled by the government,
and with only a few independent channels that must watch what they say for fear of government
reprisal, fines, and possible closure of their media outlet.” The opposition viewpoint in this
dialogue also compares the large number of government-owned and controlled television
networks to the lack of opposition-owned and controlled channels.).
113. Along with media control, “Mr. Chávez and his allies still control every significant
federal institution in the country, including the Supreme Court, the national oil company, the
attorney general’s office and the human rights ombudsman’s office. The bureaucracy has also
been expanding through dozens of new expropriations and nationalizations of private
corporations.” Romero, Shift in Venezuelan Politics as Chavez's Opposition Reclaims Seats in the
TIMES
(Sept.
28,
2010),
available
at
Legislature,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/americas/28venez.html?_r=0.
114. See also Djankov, supra note 38, at 353 (finding that countries with greater state
ownership of the media have less press, political, and economic freedom).
115. Before broadcasting, television programs and network chains must link to a central
program. Mayobre, supra note 26, at 183. Commercial television stations are forced to buy
packages including Channel 5, which features educational and documentary programming. Id.
116. During the first nine years of his presidency, Chávez ordered 1,710 mandatory
broadcasts of his speeches and other government events, for a total of 43 days of uninterrupted
transmission, often during peak viewing hours. During two months of the 2002-03 oil strike,
President Chávez used 40 hours of airtime in addition to his weekly television and radio program.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 70.
117. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13, at 13. “The broadcast media helped to create
Chávez.” Id. Chávez appeared on television during failed 1992 coup that first brought him in the
public eye. Id. Before his election in 1998, he participated in televised interviews and debates. Id.
It has been suggested that the print media, including papers like El Nacional and Tal Cual, has
often been created more opposition to Chávez than the televised media. Id.
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into a public figure in his speeches.118 Additionally, Chávez created a
2009 reform abolishing term limits for the presidency and other elected
offices to reinforce and extend his political power.119 These actions
showed a willingness to use both media and regulation for pure political
gains.120
Opponents to Chávez media regulation asserted that the
government dangerously restrained the media through the use of law
and judicial enforcement.121 Obligations under laws such as RESORTE
restrained what the media could broadcast and publish, with stations
facing suspension and revocation of licenses for broadcasting material
deemed inappropriate.122 Through specific registration and licensing
requirements, the government selected whom, and under what
conditions, could publish or broadcast.123 Failure to comply with
requirements could lead to shutdown by the CONATEL.124 As of
August 2009, thirty-four radio stations had recently had their licenses
revoked, allegedly for “irregular paperwork.”125 The government
targeted over two hundred additional radio stations for other alleged
irregularities.126 The high number of stations facing difficulties
involving government regulators demonstrated that government
sanctioning may have been inappropriate and arbitrary, buttressing the
118. A few days before the article was published, during his weekly Aló Presidente radio
broadcast, Chávez asked that the national coat of arms be modified since his daughter had noticed
that the white horse on the emblem was looking the wrong way. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 57, at 92.
119. See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 96.
120. Id. (“Venezuela’s leading newspapers are privately owned, and most identify with the
opposition. As a result, they are subject to threats and violence by the government and its
supporters, sometimes leading to self-censorship. Local and regional media are particularly
dependent on government advertising revenue, leaving them vulnerable to economic retaliation
for criticism.”).
121. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 88, at 406 (citing the lack of process in administrative
proceedings, use of sanctions, high-level decision making, and interruption of programming).
Chief dangerous restraints in the law and targeted attacks against the media during the first
decade of media regulation under Chávez include: an expansion of the scope of insult laws,
increased penalties for defamation, libel, and vaguely defined incitement provisions, restrictions
upon public access to information, and favoring government-owned over privately-owned
television channels. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 90–91.
122. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 88, at 406.
123. One pre-Chávez journalism law, passed in 1994, created strict licensure requirements for
journalism. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. The law established harsh penalties, including
imprisonment, for practicing without a license. Id.
124. CONATEL, formerly known as the Ministry of Communication, is Venezuela’s
independent telecommunications regulator. Comision Nacional de Telecomunicaciones: Conatel
NEWS
AMERICAS,
http://www.bnamericas.com/companyVenezuela,
BUSINESS
profile/en/Comision_Nacional_de_Telecomunicaciones-Conatel_Venezuela (last visited Nov. 29,
2010). The agency is intended to facilitate “projects between government agencies and other
organizations that promote the integration of telecommunications services, and encourages the
proliferation of information through such projects.” Id.
125. Venezuelan TV Station, supra note 76.
126. Id.
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opposition argument against regulation.
The political opposition also pointed to the Chávez government’s
continuous attempts to increase government influence over media. In
August 2010, the government temporarily shut down the newspaper 6to
Poder (“Sixth Power”) for publishing a photo montage of six prominent
female officials dressed as cabaret dancers.127 Along with the violent
photograph ban, this action suggested the government had extended its
control over newspapers, despite the lack of clear publishing
regulations.
A bill proposed in 2009 would imprison journalists and
broadcasters for up to four years for publishing “harmful” material that
threatens “the peace, security and independence of the nation and the
institutions of the state.”128 In June 2010, the government created the
Center for Situational Studies of the Nation, which has broad powers in
limiting the dissemination of information that it deems confidential.129
These actions indicated the government’s willingness to expand control
over the media, potentially a willingness to infringe upon freedoms of
expression and information. On the whole, the various measures taken
to restrict media, particularly privately owned opposition media,
bolstered the view that the Chávez government overstepped its
obligations and threatened the rights of Venezuelans.
B. International Voices Supporting the Political Opposition Position
International voices, such as global media outlets and human rights
organizations, predominately favored the political opposition position,
presenting government media regulation as harmful. Negative
international responses to Chávez’s actions against the media included
placing Venezuela on media watch lists,130 declaring that its media
127. The article was entitled “The Mighty Girls of the Revolution.” See El Universal,
Venezuelan Government is Urged to Respect Free Media, EL UNIVERSAL (Aug. 31, 2011),
available at http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/08/31/venezuelan-govt-is-urged-to-respect-freemedia.shtml.
128. Will Grant, Venezuela Mulls Tough Media Law, B.B.C. NEWS (July 31, 2009),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8177862.stm.
129. Venezuela: Close Chávez’s New Censorship Office, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 21,
2010),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/21/venezuela-close-chavez-s-new-censorship-office.
(“On June 1, 2010, President Hugo Chávez issued a presidential decree creating the Center for
Situational Studies of the Nation (Centro de Estudio Situacional de la Nación, CESNA), which
has broad powers to limit public dissemination of “information, facts or circumstance[s]” that it
decides should be confidential.”). Human Rights Watch portrays this as the creation of a
“censorship office,” claiming that broadly worded guidelines will allow for controlling and
censoring public debate through the employment of criminal penalties. Id.
130. In October 2000, the International Press Institute placed Venezuela on its “Watch List”
for threats to the freedom of the press, and the nation has been placed on the list several times
since then. See Michael Kudlak, IPI Press Freedom Advocacy Mission Set to Visit Venezuela,
PRESS
INST.
(Nov.
13,
2009),
http://www.freemedia.at/ourINT’L.
activities/missions/singleview/4608/. The International Press Institute (IPI) is a “global
organization of editors, media executives and leading journalists dedicated to the protection of
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status was “not free,”131 condemning actions like the violent photograph
ban on a case-by-case basis,132 and holding conferences on the topic.133
For example, Human Rights Watch declared, “[i]n its efforts to gain
ground in this “media war,” the government has engaged in
discriminatory actions against media airing opposition viewpoints,
strengthened the state’s capacity to limit free speech, and created
powerful incentives for government critics to engage in selfcensorship.”134 From the perspective of international organizations, the
Chávez administration punished them for speaking out and reflecting
dangers to Venezuelan media.135 Critics of the Chávez regulations
consistently cited reactions by international organizations as indicative
of threats to their rights by the government.136
International law supplements domestic authority on media-related
freedoms.137 Much like the views of domestic political opposition to
Chávez, international advocacy on the media tends to be ideologically
press freedom.” Id. They sent an “advocacy mission” to Venezuela in November 2009. Id.
131. The 2009 Freedom House Press Survey cited several factors related to an overall decline
in press freedom. See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 96. Chief concerns include the “politicization
of the judiciary, widespread corruption, harassment of the opposition, extensive self-censorship,
and reprisals orchestrated by public officials.” Id. Among the dangerous restrictions on media are
RESORTE’s vaguely worded provisions, harsh penalties for offensive material in insult laws, and
denials of access to independent journalists at official ceremonies. Id. Past reports have also
condemned the decline in press freedoms in Venezuela. See, e.g., id. (citing increased severity in
punishments for disrespect (“descato”), insult laws, mandatory broadcasting of cadenas, direct
assaults against journalists and media outlets, and government control over several media
sources).
132. See Greenslade, supra note 93 (“The International Federation of Journalists has
condemned the jail sentence and fine handed out to Venezuelan columnist Francisco Perez.”).
Other organizations speaking out against the use of restraints and attacks upon the media include
Reporters without Borders, the National Journalists’ Guild, and Human Rights Watch.
133. See El Universal, Freedom of the Press in Latin America Conference, EL UNIVERSAL
(Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/111118/freedom-ofthe-press-in-latin-america-conference.
134. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 64.
135. Journalists and organizational representatives have been subject to criminal
investigations and prosecution and even forced to leave the country. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 57 (The Chávez administration has instigated criminal investigations of human rights
organizations allegedly receiving funding from the United States as well as prosecuted several
critics of the government. Nor has the government provided protection for human rights
“defenders” receiving threats.). In reaction to Human Rights Watch’s Decade Under Chávez
report, two journalists were thrown out of the country. FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 96.
136. See, e.g., El Universal, IAPA [Inter-American Press Association] Rejects Laws Affecting
Free Speech in Venezuela and Ecuador, EL UNIVERSAL, Nov. 18, 2011, available at
http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/111118/iapa-rejects-laws-affecting-free-speechin-venezuela-and-ecuador (opposition cites international press association view that draft law on
Communication for People’s Power, which would allocate funds and provide equal assignment of
official advertisements to community media, would infringe upon free speech).
137. International law has even been used in creating Venezuela’s law. “In enacting
RESORTE, the Venezuelan National Assembly looked abroad for guidance. The Assembly
studied legislation from seven countries as well as international human rights conventions
containing freedom of expression and children rights provisions during the drafting period.” Soto,
supra note 24, at 428.
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democracy-driven.138 For instance, the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, signed by Venezuela in 2001, asserts that freedom of
expression and the press are essential components of the exercise of
democracy.139 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights called for
preliminary protective measures in favor of privately owned media
outlets, which the Venezuelan government refused to enforce.140 This
authority questioned Chávez’s creation and use of domestic regulations
against the media.
C. Threats to Freedoms of Expression and Information
Opposition and international advocates argued that the Chávez
administration’s actions threatened the freedoms of expression and
information for the press and the people. The violent photograph ban
involved both the right to publish the image (expression) and the right
of the people to know about crime and violence (information). The
opposition maintained that the crucial development of a participatory
democracy requires these freedoms.141
The opposition responded to government regulation with
complaints about rights. After government closure of the 6to Poder
newspaper, opposition voices questioned the government’s interference
and discussed effects upon freedom of expression.142 Opposition
members regularly called for the need for information143 and intensified
138. See CANNON, supra note 29, at 113 (presenting democratic framework).
139. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 88. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). (“Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.”).
140. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Expression in International Law: Comparative Jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 379 (2006). The
Venezuelan embassy has renounced the authority of this court, however. See Ministry of People’s
Power for Foreign Affairs, IACHR Attempts to Impose its Decisions on Internal Affairs in
Venezuela, EMBASSY OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA IN THE U.S. (Sept. 19,
2011), available at http://venezuela-us.org/2011/09/19/iachr-attempts-to-impose-its-decisions-oninternal-affairs-in-venezuela-2/ (“the government will proceed in denouncing the IACHR as an
institution that constantly oversteps its functions and regularly makes decisions that are politically
partial in nature and against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.”).
141. The preamble to the 1999 Constitution terms Venezuela a “democratic, participatory,
and protagonistic society.” See Ellner & Hellinger, supra note 30, at 181, 187. Much of the
debate about this ideal considers what respective levels of direct civic participation and
representation should be present. Id.
142. See B.B.C. Mundo, ¿Qué Dice una Detención Sobre la Justicia y los Medios en
Venezuela?, B.B.C. MUNDO (Aug. 24, 2012), available at http://www.elnacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/231774/BBC%20Mundo/¿Qué-dice-unadetención-sobre-la-justicia-y-los-medios-en-Venezuela?. See also supra note 128 and
accompanying text.
143. See Ender Ramírez Padrino and María Corina Machado, El Futuro de los Medios Será el
Respeto y el Acceso a Toda la Información, EL NACIONAL (Aug. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.elnacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/226338/Nación/Mar%C3%ADa%20Corina%2
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debate.144 Often, these voices discussed freedom of the press
concurrently with freedom of expression and the right to information.145
In particular, opposition and international voices emphasized the need
for improved investigative journalism in order to prevent corruption,
promote democracy, and inform the people.146 Journalists cited legal,
economic, and political constraints inside and outside of the newsroom,
such as the lack of access to government documents and financial
resources, warnings from editors and owners, and threats to their
lives.147 In addition, the experiences of neighboring Latin American
countries were cited as examples of how creating unjustifiable
limitations upon the press can be a slippery slope.148
Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution advocates for media-related
freedoms by expressly granting rights of expression and information.149
Article 57 of the Constitution proclaims, “Everyone has the right to
express freely his or her thoughts, ideas or opinions orally, in writing or
by any other form of expression, and to use for such purpose any means
0Machado:%20El%20futuro%20de%20los%20medios%20será%20el%20respeto%20y%20el%2
0acceso%20a%20toda%20la%20información (speech by a MUD member and Deputy to the
National Assembly, promising that newspapers will defend freedom of information); AVN,
Defensora del Pueblo Instó a Medios a Cuidar el Manejo de Informaciones, EL NACIONAL (Aug.
25,
2011),
available
at
http://www.elnacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php/comentar/www/files/comentar/p_contenido.php?q=nod
o/232257/Nación/Defensora-del-Pueblo-instó-a-medios-a-cuidar-el-manejo-de-informaciones
(coverage encouraging accurate media reporting).
144. See Gustavo Méndez, “We, Venezuelans, are Fed Up with Polarization,” EL
UNIVERSAL (Nov. 19, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-ypolitica/111119/we-venezuelans-are-fed-up-with-polarization (president of Andrés Bello Catholic
University (UCAB) and opposition supporter José Virtuoso calls for debate and dialogue, stating
need for development of participatory democracy).
145. See Silvio Waisbord, The Challenges of Investigative Journalism, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
382 (2002).
146. Waisbord discusses investigative journalism’s role in Latin America democracies,
including publicizing information about wrongdoing affecting public interest and increasing
political accountability. Id. at 377. He contends, “press freedom could be understood as a set of
conditions anchored in a set of laws and practices that strengthen the autonomy of news
organizations and reporters.” Id. See also Reyes, supra note 39.
147. Id.; Waisbord, supra note 145, at 383 (citing external legal constraints including the lack
of a right to information, right to reply laws of lack thereof, gag laws, insult and defamation, lack
of independent judiciary, alongside political and economic constraints).
148. See Jairo E. Lanao, Legal Challenges to Freedom of Press in the Americas, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 347 (2002). Lanao identifies several major limits upon Latin American press
freedoms: the criminalization of speech, particularly through criminal libel and insult laws;
licensing and privacy restrictions; and electoral bans. Id. Many of these limits are similar to, or
more egregious than, those occurring in Venezuela. For example, the decades-long
criminalization of speech in several countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay, has led to
consistent punishment of journalists in these nations. Id. at 356–58. One censorship-related issue
in this context is the use of prior restraint to stop the dissemination of materials to the public. Id.
at 360. These measures may threaten both individual and collective rights. Id.
149. Id. For background and analysis regarding the freedom of expression from an American
perspective, see Steven Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1275 (1998).
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of communication and diffusion, and no censorship shall be
established.”150 Likewise, Article 58 provides, “Everyone has the right
to timely, truthful and impartial information, without censorship.”151
These provisions provide for the ideals cited by the opposition.
However, difficulties with vagueness, lack of administrative guidelines
and support, and adverse judicial interpretation limited absolute reliance
on Constitutional provisions.152 Thus, the opposition needed to focus on
new paradigms for promoting rights outside of the current domestic
structure.153 For example, access to public information, would promote
accountability, efficiency, and transparency in political, economic, and
public administration spheres.154 The opposition viewpoint demanded
the protection of both positive and negative freedoms for the people and
the media.155
The privately owned opposition media and international voices
considered Chávez’s measures against the media to be threats to
freedoms of expression and information, advancing the argument that
regulations such as the violent photo ban were impermissible. This
position called for reduced regulation and greater media freedoms.
IV. REGULATION AND RIGHTS: BALANCING THE MEDIA WAR
The conflicting positions presented in Parts II and III advocate for
distinct approaches to media regulation. While the Chávez government
position favored the power to create regulations, the opposition position
feared government infringement upon freedoms. Both positions provide
meaningful arguments for the future of Venezuelan media. On one
hand, when Venezuela faces grave threats to the future of its children or
150. Constitution, supra note 54, art. 57.
151. Id. art. 58. During the constitutional assembly, Article 58 was one of the most
controversial articles. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 33. Opponents read in a grant of power of the
state to censor information that it determined to not be true or impartial. Id. In fact, in 1992,
Venezuelan journalists blocked an effort by President Caldera to include a similar amendment. Id.
152. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 88, at 152. For example, the inability to identify the
“truth” allows the government to control information-sharing and selectively punish the
opposition. Id. The government is free to reject and even persecute for information that it claims
to be in contravention of Article 58. Id. Brewer-Carias cites RESORTE and decisions of the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice as examples of such government impropriety. Id.
153. See, e.g., John M. Ackerman and Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of
Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85 (2006) (surveying freedom of information
laws from an administrative perspective, argue that freedom of information laws are essential to
imposing accountability in new democracies). The authors link freedom of expression and
freedom of information: “In order to form opinions that are worthy of being expressed,
individuals must have access to relevant government information.” Id. at 88. “Citizens can only
be considered to be fully informed and able to participate as democratic citizens if they are able to
access the information held about them and on their behalf by the government.” Id.
154. Id. at 92.
155. Freedom of information may be best framed as a positive freedom and essential
individual liberty requiring affirmative government action. Id. This would function in connection
with negative freedoms such as the freedom to express without censorship and control. Id. at 90.
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national stability, some protection may be necessary. On the other hand,
extreme regulation may threaten basic human rights. A clear "win" by
either side in the media war could be detrimental to the public.
Ultimately, a balance between the two positions is integral in
determining whether regulations such as the violent photo ban should be
permissible.
A. Emphasizing Extremes Endangers the Public Good
Emphasizing either side of the media war to the exclusion of the
other harms the public good. Both positions presented realistic concerns
about the potential outcomes of domination by the other. While the
Chávez government argued that media regulations such as the violent
photo ban were necessary measures for protecting its citizenry, the
opposition argued that such measures posed threats to freedoms of
expression and information.156 Allowing one side to prevail over the
other would endanger the people and pluralism. Therefore, a balance
between the two positions is crucial.
1. Prioritizing the People
The well-being of Venezuelan citizens must be the paramount
consideration when analyzing the competing positions.157 Actions such
as the violent photo ban should be considered in the context of the
tumultuous social problems in Venezuela, not just as a battle in an
ongoing media war.158 The photo controversy arose at a time of extreme
violence and social unrest.159 Violent crime, as so prominently displayed
in the El Nacional photograph, threatens the lives of individual citizens
and the stability of a society that has been called “more deadly than
Iraq.”160
A police study leaked in 2008 estimated that approximately ten
thousand violent deaths occur each year in Venezuela.161 Studies in the
past few years estimate that over fifty murders per 100 thousand
Venezuelans are committed each year.162 Likewise, approximately two
156. See supra parts II and III.
157. See CANNON, supra note 29, at 130 (The media war “must be put into the broader
context of contemporary Venezuelan society to be understood properly.”).
158. Focusing on drama, coups, demonstrations, and rhetoric wrongly deemphasizes
“fundamental structural issues of economics, class, and polity.” Ellner & Hellinger, supra note
30.
159. Romero, supra note 2 (citing an “unprecedented climb” in homicides over the past
decade).
160. Romero, supra note 2 (citing contributing factors to the murder rates including a grim
economic climate, the availability of “millions of illegal firearms,” and deficiencies in police
control). See also Molinski, supra note 2 (discussing high homicide rates as well as the potential
connection between the violent photograph and threats to society).
161. Molinski, supra note 2.
162. Molinski, supra note 2. See also Francisco Olivares, Factory of Violence, EL
UNIVERSAL (Nov. 12, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-
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hundred homicides are committed per 100 thousand residents each year
in the capital city of Caracas, where the gory photograph was taken.163
Approximately ninety percent of murders are never solved, and the
majority fail to result in even one arrest.164 While some claim that these
numbers rose significantly since Chávez’s election in 1998, Chávez
denied this.165 The lack of certain measurement demonstrates the patent
need for both accurate information from the government and accurate
reporting in the media.166 What is certain is that the violence portrayed
in the banned photograph permeates Venezuelan society.167 Therefore,
analysis of the media war must take violence into account.
Citizens also face economic concerns.168 Venezuela’s economy has
struggled since a decline in oil prices in the 1980s.169 By recent
measurements, it is the only shrinking economy in South America.170
Venezuela has the highest inflation rate in the Western hemisphere at
politica/111112/factory-of-violence (providing similar estimates of 57 victims per 100,000
residents, making Venezuela the second most violent nation on the continent—although this
statistic comes from non-official sources and has been rejected by Chávez).
163. Romero, supra note 2. The city of Caracas has the second highest murder rate in the
Western hemisphere. This compares to about 22.7 homicides per 100,000 people in Bogotá,
Colombia’s capital, and 14 homicides per 100,000 in São Paulo, Brazil.
164. Id. One potential explanation is the low salaries paid to police officers. Some have
turned to crimes and corruption to supplement their incomes. The Chávez government recently
created a new security force, the Bolivarian National Police.
165. Compare Romero, supra note 2 (stating that "the judicial system has grown increasingly
politicized, losing independent judges and aligning itself more closely with Mr. Chávez’s political
movement and that many experienced state employees have had to leave public service, or even
the country.”), with Olivares, supra note 163 (stating Chávez, who claims that he has decreased
murder rates, declared, “The thought of Venezuela being one of the most dangerous countries in
the world is untrue. And it is false that here there is more violence, compared with 11 years ago.
Eh?”).
166. See AVN, PNB: Medios Privados Pretenden Crear una Percepción de Elevada
(Aug.
12,
2011),
available
at
http://www.elInseguridad,
EL NACIONAL
nacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php/ayuda/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/228573/Sucesos/PNB:Medios-privados-pretenden-crear-una-percepción-de-elevada-inseguridad (Director of Police
complains that the private media advances a high perception of insecurity and attacks police,
rather than discussing reductions in crime and homicide rates). The Chávez government has not
published statistics on violent crime since 2003. See also Molinski, supra note 2. The government
website fails to give homicide rates, although it does provide suicide statistics.
167. Recent surveys indicate that crime is the “preeminent” concern of Venezuelan citizens.
Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 4.
168. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 2 (“While many Latin American economies are growing
fast, Venezuela’s has continued to shrink. The gap between rich and poor remains wide, despite
spending on anti-poverty programs, fueling resentment.”).
169. Id. See Robert Plummer, What Now for Venezuela's Economy?, B.B.C. NEWS (Oct. 7,
2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19813533?print=true. Venezuela has
struggled with major economic problems including high inflation, currency devaluation, and
external debt.
170. Simon Romero, In Venezuela, a New Wave of Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/world/americas/07venez.html?ref=venezuela
(discussing the replacement of educated professionals leaving the country with an influx of
immigrants drawn by loose immigration policies, the opportunity to make an income, and the
availability of social welfare programs).
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greater than thirty percent a year.171 Additionally, socioeconomic
disparities between rich and poor citizens within the nation are
striking.172 The top twenty percent of the population accounts for about
fifty-two percent of all household incomes.173 As of 2005, less than five
percent of the populace owned eighty percent of the nation’s land.174 At
the same time, there is a large mass of chronically and severely poor.175
These economic issues are likely to contribute to violence and overall
instability, while also deeply affecting issues including children,
national security, and the role of the media.
The often conflicting positions of the privately owned opposition
media and government take on greater significance when considered in
light of these national concerns. Ultimately, both sides in the media war
desired to solve these problems. Both sides considered the people a top
priority, although each side focused upon different means towards this
end. Chávez supporters considered the distribution of ownership and
protection of vulnerable groups necessary, while the opposition found
the government’s attempts harmful to negative and affirmative rights.
These positions must be reconciled according to their common aim of
aiding the people.
2. Encouraging Political Pluralism, Not Polarization
Supplanting polarization with pluralism would improve, and
perhaps even eliminate, the Venezuelan media war. The role of the
media vis-à-vis the Chávez administration was tumultuous; the
conflicting positions in the media war not easily reconciled.
Nevertheless, combining regulation and media freedom can provide a
crucial mix of voices. Moving forward, political pluralism will best be
promoted by allowing room for both an active media and reasonable
governmental regulation.
Both the privately owned media and the Chávez administration
represented politicized and individualized interests that would likely
interfere with the Venezuelan public interest were they to gain absolute
171. Id.
172. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. The economic stratification in Venezuela is striking.
(“With such a small group of very wealthy persons and a huge mass of chronically and severely
poor, Venezuela’s income distribution is similar to that of traditionally wealthy yet politically
corrupt nations of Africa and Asia and considerably more skewed than the United States and
United Kingdom.”).
173. Id.
174. Clive Myrie, Revolution on Venezuela’s Estates, B.B.C. NEWS (Aug. 23, 2005),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4721961.stm. Having declared an “economic
war” against the bourgeoisie, Chávez expropriated at least 207 private businesses in 2010,
including banks, cattle ranches and housing developments, prompting many middle and upper
class citizens to leave the country. See Romero, supra note 2.
175. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. Although poverty rates worsened since he took
office, Chávez has blamed crime and violence upon the high poverty rates in the time before he
took office. See Molinski, supra note 2.
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domination. In particular, the current polarization of the press is
intertwined with ownership.176 On the one hand, the private media’s
calls for freedom of expression and freedom of the press may be
contradictory, as each demand for “autonomy of editors, publishers, and
media owner . . . is often in reality a property claim disguised as a claim
for free speech.”177 In a society with definite socioeconomic disparities,
the lower and middle classes may require protection beyond those
promoted by the freedom of expression for upper class media owners.178
On the other hand, a publicly owned press does not necessarily lead to
the representation of public voices.179 True pluralism in Venezuela’s
media and society requires a “multiplicity of ideas and sources of
information.”180
Political diversity exists among the Venezuelan electorate,
establishing the need for a matching multiplicity of information. For
example, Chávez won presidential re-election in October 2012 with
54% of the popular vote, with turnout at around 81%, while his chosen
political successor, Nicolas Maduro, won 50.7% of the vote in the April
2013 election.181 Although these close results showed practical threats to
Chávez and his party’s power, his party still holds considerable support,
since it maintained about half of the popular vote.182
Another strong example of political pluralism in Venezuela was
the failure of sixty-nine Constitutional reforms proposed by Chávez.183
176. See supra notes 38–41, 114–115, and accompanying text.
177. CANNON, supra note 29, at 126.
178. Enhancing opposition media protection could reinforce the gap between rich and poor
rather than promoting collective betterment. In 2003, foreign minister, Roy Chaderton,
“complained that the media are immune from the electoral process,” claiming that “in Venezuela,
you can disagree with the military, religious leaders, intellectuals and politicians, but never dare
to challenge the holders of media concessions.” Venezuela’s Media War, supra note 21.
179. If the goal is a pluralistic and people-controlled media, maybe truly public television
channels would help. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 24.
180. Id.
181. Hugo Chávez celebrates re-election in Venezuela, B.B.C. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2012),
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19867445; Chávez heir Maduro
wins Venezuela presidential election, B.B.C. NEWS (Apr. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22149202. In a legislative election on September
26, 2010, opposition party members won approximately one-third of the National Assembly seats
and almost half of the popular vote. Simon Romero, Shift in Venezuelan Politics as Chávez’s
Opposition Reclaims Seats in Legislature, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/americas/28venez.html (“In practical terms, the seats
won by the opposition enable it to block critical legislation and play a role in determining the
makeup of important bodies like the Supreme Court, now packed with the president’s
supporters.”). This election took place about a month after the violent photo ban was issued.
182. Id. Additionally, the opposition does not consist of a single party, as compared to
Chávez’s party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, which is the nation’s largest. Id. “No
other party rivals [Chávez’s] in its nationwide reach. No party has at its disposal the resources of
the federal government.” Id. Furthermore, “no other politician is so identified with efforts to lift
the poor and to include them in politics.” Id.
183. The proposed amendments included ones allowing Chávez to create new administrative
regions, the power to declare unlimited states of emergency, and the ability to re-run for election
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In December 2007, the referendum narrowly failed in a popular
election—with fifty-one percent of citizens voting “no”—demonstrating
increased political support for the opposition but also ongoing support
for Chávez’s reforms.184 Perhaps most importantly, this political defeat
verified the existence of political pluralism in Venezuela, assuaging
fears of an authoritarian dictatorship and demonstrating the media’s
responsibility to represent varying viewpoints.185
Political pluralism is one of the “superior values of [Venezuela’s]
legal order.”186 News sources, both public and private, serve a
significant role in the Venezuelan political process.187 Each side
provides information and views that the other may not, which leads to
greater public knowledge and debate.188 Both sides effectively use mass
media to attract and mobilize voters during elections and in other
political events.189 The most important voice, however, is that of the
people because they are unlikely to see issues as purely black or white.
Despite Venezuela’s political diversity, the polarization
represented by both sides of the media war harms the people. Many
media sources in Venezuela may in fact amplify the social polarization
between the poor and privileged by pandering towards specific
viewpoints and classes.190 Divided parties should constructively work
indefinitely. Simon Romero, Venezuela Vote Sets Roadblocks on Chávez Path, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
4,
2010),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/world/americas/04venezuela.html?_r=1.
184. Id. During the referendum debate, the opposition and international media framed the
proposed reforms as a “putative attack on private property” and an attempt to expand
authoritarian power. BRUCE, supra note 34, at 177. From the socialist Chávez perspective, the
core objective of the referendum was increasing popular power. Id.
185. Romero, supra note 183 (“For nine years, a combination of populist politics and rising
oil prices have propelled Mr. Chávez’s socialist program for Venezuela with an almost inexorable
momentum. On Sunday, his country put on the brakes. Those results have at once given the
opposition a sudden boost and demonstrated the resilience of Venezuela’s institutions.”). See
Vincent Bevins, A Failed Reform, Chávez, and Democracy in Venezuela, LEFT TURN (Jan. 18,
2010)
http://www.leftturn.org/failed-reform-ch%C3%A1vez-and-democracy-venezuela
(“Chávez’ proposed constitutional reform was far from the cynical power grab it was portrayed as
in the U.S. press . . . . the result has finally forced recognition that Venezuelan elections are free
and transparent, and that Mr. Chávez is not, and has never been, a dictator. Dictators do not lose
elections.”).
186. Constitution, supra note 54, art. 2 (“Venezuela constitutes itself as a Democratic and
Social State of Law and Justice, which holds as superior values of its legal order and actions those
of life, liberty, justice, equality, solidarity, democracy, social responsibility and, in general, the
preeminence of human rights, ethics and political pluralism.”).
187. Although the nation “has been polarized between Chávez’s supporters and detractors,
Venezuela still enjoys a vibrant public debate in which anti-government and pro-government
media are equally vocal in their criticism and defense of Chávez.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 57, at 64.
188. The privately owned media essentially leads the opposition fight against Chávez in place
of a cohesive political opposition. See Venezuela’s Media War, supra note 23 (“Government
sympathizers accuse the private media of leading the fight against the “Bolivarian Revolution” in
the absence of a credible and united political opposition.”).
189. See Ellner & Hellinger, supra note 30, at 48.
190. Id. at 49.
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together towards building a better media for the people instead of
combating one another.191 Political pluralism will best be upheld by
embracing public debate in the media rather than by giving full
credence to either position in the media war.
On the whole, the interests and influence of each position in the
Venezuelan media war demand a balance rather than a grant of
unfettered power to either side. If the government uses regulation purely
to censor political opposition, the democratic structure of the nation will
be threatened. Alternatively, some power to regulate must be granted to
the government, as the politicized role of the media calls for reasonable
limits in order to protect the citizenry. Political pluralism, which is
integral to the public good, will be maintained if each position in the
media war retains a public voice.
3. International Coverage and Existing Frameworks Are Inadequate
As international analysis dominates much of the discourse on
Venezuela’s media war, the equally polarized, politicized nature of
international coverage requires skepticism.192 The United States
government supported political opposition to Chávez, most notably
though substantial funding of opposition-aligned campaigns in privately
owned media.193 Negative framing by major U.S. media sources
reflected this bias by tending to distort coverage of Venezuela.194 Other
international actors more sympathetic to the Chávez administration
191. In speeches Chávez has “demonized his media critics as “facists,” “terrorists,” “enemies
of the people,” “liars,” “coup-mongers,” “immoral,” “trash,” and “laboratories of psychological
warfare.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 72. The opposition has also participated in
name-calling. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57. This rhetoric is likely to be
counterproductive from either side, as it does not address the real issues at stake.
192. Admittedly, this may require greater scrutiny of many of the sources cited in this article.
193. The United States government has long provided funding to Venezuelan media that
supports the aims of the opposition. For example, during the oil industry shutdown in 2002 and
2003, USAID/DAI provided $10,000 for a media campaign supporting the strikers. WILPERT,
supra note 30, at 172. More recently, United States embassy cables published by Wikileaks
exposed the close relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela’s private media. See Tamara
Pearson, Wikileaks Cables Reveal U.S. Embassy Works with Venezuelan Private Media,
VENEZUELANALYSIS (Sept. 6, 2011), http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6469. The U.S.
ambassador to Venezuela met with representatives from El Nacional, Globovision, and the
Cisneros Group to discuss political content and U.S. funding. According to a Chávez supporter,
“[f]or 2011, the U.S congress approved a multimillion budget in order to transmit the thirty
minute program five days a week in Venezuela, supposedly to counteract the anti-US propaganda
by the Venezuelan government.” Additionally, recently declassified U.S. State Department
documents show that the U.S. government funded over $4 million to private media and during
2008-10, as part of a more comprehensive $40 million investment in Venezuelan opposition
through agencies including the Panamerican Development Foundation (PADF), Freedom House,
and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Golinger, supra note 36.
194. Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations,
supra note 41 (“The Washington Post, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal broadly
report on and reinforce the negative frames on Venezuela that serve as a basis for debates over
U.S. policy towards the country.”).
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supported his actions in regards to media.195 Overall, the international
response to media-related regulation and rights only amplified political
polarization during Chávez’s time in power.196 Accordingly, the
Venezuelan people, instead of outside voices, should control their
media’s future.197
Likewise, frameworks for assessing and aspiring to improve media
may not adequately address the needs of the Venezuelan people.198
Many models are based purely on “democratic” ideals that do not
entirely account for Venezuela’s dynamic political structure and
consistently choose rights over regulation.199 For example, the Fourth
Estate model aspires to an independent press that fulfills its duty to
publish information related to the public interest, thus promoting
government accountability and monitoring democratic institutions.200
The informed citizenry model also focuses upon the freedom of
information. It considers public access to accurate information a
“primary condition of democratic life.”201 While the principles behind
these frameworks are useful, Venezuelan media should be analyzed
under a model that considers Venezuela’s current capabilities and
socialist aims alongside democratic values.
Other models address the issues of ownership and popular
participation in the press. For example, Herman and Chomsky’s
propaganda model questions the impartiality of profit-driven private
media.202 Public interest, also known as “Pigouvian,” theory favors
195. See B.B.C., Argentina Gives Hugo Chávez Press Freedom Award, B.B.C. NEWS (Mar.
29, 2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12902155 (Argentine
University of La Plata gave Chávez an award for efforts to break “media monopolies” and
“support popular communication.”).
196. Furthermore, the United States, like the Venezuelan government, seems to find limits on
acceptable expression. On television Chávez held up photographs of victims of the United States
bombing of Afghanistan and called it a “slaughter of innocents.” ELLNER, supra note 33, at 198.
As a result, the U.S. temporarily withdrew its Ambassador, while Colin Powell voiced his doubts
about Venezuela’s “democratic understanding.” Id.
197. See, e.g., Edward Ellis, Missing the Point: Media Speculations Over Venezuela,
VENEZUELANALYSIS (Sep. 12, 2011), http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/64836483197
(pointing to the dearth of international coverage on the creation of a new regional alliance, the
Community of Latin American States (CELAC)).
198. This discussion does not purport to be a comprehensive analysis of media frameworks;
instead, it provides examples of existing frameworks.
199. Whether Venezuela should be considered a socialist or democratic nation is beyond the
scope of this article; however, polarization in the media clearly reflects divergent political
ideologies.
200. See, e.g., JULIANNE SCHULTZ, REVIVING THE FOURTH ESTATE: DEMOCRACY,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE MEDIA (1998).
201. Waisbord, supra note 145, at 381. See also Mark Bovens, Information Rights:
Citizenship in the Information Society, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 317 (2002); Alasdair Roberts, Structural
Pluralism and the Right to Information, 51 TORONTO L.J. 259 (2001) (framing the right to
freedom of information as a basic right of political participation).
202. See EDWARD HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (Pantheon Books, 1988) (framework for analyzing
propaganda nature of media considers ownership, funding, sourcing, flak, and anti-communist
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government ownership of the media and treatment of information as a
public good.203 Public choice theory, on the other hand, supposes that
government-owned media is detrimental to society.204 Finally,
Habermas’ public sphere model calls for societal pluralism and full
participation.205 Ultimately, the macro-economic nature of these models
fails to account for the day-to-day concerns of the Venezuelan people,
or contemplate more nuanced control and ownership over the media.
Thus, current frameworks for assessing media are limited. Each
model chooses between regulation and rights, or provides for ownership
by only one segment of society. Both perspectives in Venezuela’s media
war, however, possess strong rationales and goals favoring
advancement of the Venezuelan people. The needs of the Venezuelan
people will not be served by adopting the views of either extreme.
Therefore, Venezuelan media should be analyzed using a distinct
framework that balances necessary government regulation against
fundamental rights.
B. Balancing Best Promotes the Public Good
Resorting to either extreme in the media war would lead to
problematic results; thus, analysis of Venezuela’s media war requires
balancing.206 Promoting the public good necessitates a combination of
both regulations, offsetting the powerful privately owned media, and
established rights, preventing governmental abuse. Such a framework is
ideal for Venezuela for several reasons. First, a balancing framework
allows for reasonable government regulation and action. Second, a
balancing framework accounts for the rights at stake. Ultimately, the
balance framework measures rights and regulation according to the
needs of the Venezuelan people. This contextual analysis provides the
requisite flexibility necessary to account for Venezuela’s dynamic
nature. While this analysis is especially useful for considering
Venezuelan media, it can be used in considering any governmental
ideology).
203. Djankov et al., supra note 38, at 341–42 (Public interest theory believes that
governments maximize consumer welfare, looking at information as public good, with strong
increasing returns due to low marginal costs of dissemination, and public exposure to accurate
and unbiased information.).
204. Id. Public choice theory theorizes that government ownership “would distort and
manipulate information to entrench the incumbent politicians, preclude voters and consumers
from making informed decisions, and ultimately undermine both democracy and markets;” it also
advocates for media’s role as a fourth estate providing extra checks and balances. Id.
205. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (1962, English Translation 1989). See
also CANNON, supra note 29, at 126.
206. A case-by-case inquiry into whether the Chávez administration’s stated objectives
outweigh the limitations on freedoms of expression and information would likely be unworkable
and subjective, and may also lead to the problematic consequences of allowing one side to
prevail.
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regulation or action regarding the media.
Domestic and international laws, whether binding or merely
aspirational, all advocate for a balance between regulation and rights.
For instance, Articles 57,207 58,208 and 60209 of the 1999 Constitution
guarantee basic rights to free speech, expression, and information
alongside references to accompanying responsibilities and restraints.210
The first sentence of Article 58 is telling: “Communications are free and
plural, and involve the duties and responsibilities indicated by law.”211
While this provision grants “free and plural” communication rights,
they remain subject to legal regulation through “duties and
responsibilities indicated by law.” Similarly, RESORTE Article 6(2)
asserts “censorship is prohibited, without prejudice to the duty of the
State to establish further responsibilities arising from the exercise of
freedom of expression and information in accordance with the
Constitution and the law.”212 Overall, these domestic laws balance
recognition and restraint of the Chávez government and privately owned
opposition media’s conflicting positions.
International law reflects and expounds upon the balancing
principles of Venezuela’s domestic law. Venezuela is a long-time
member of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and
the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
207. Article 57 reads, “Everyone has the right to express freely his or her thoughts, ideas or
opinions orally, in writing or by any other form of expression, and to use for such purpose any
means of communication and diffusion, and no censorship shall be established. Anyone making
use of this right assumes full responsibility for everything expressed. Anonymity, war
propaganda, discriminatory messages or those promoting religious intolerance are not permitted.
Censorship restricting the ability of public officials to report on matters for which they are
responsible is prohibited.” Constitution, supra note 54, art. 57.
208. Article 58 reads, “Communications are free and plural, and involve the duties and
responsibilities indicated by law. Everyone has the right to timely, truthful and impartial
information, without censorship, in accordance with the principles of this Constitution, as well as
the right to reply and corrections when they are directly affected by inaccurate or offensive
information. Children and adolescents have the right to receive adequate information for purposes
of their overall development.” Id. art. 58.
209. Article 60 provides, “Every person is entitled to protection of his or her honor, private
life, intimacy, self-image, confidentiality and reputation. The use of electronic information shall
be restricted by law in order to guarantee the personal and family intimacy and honor of citizens
and the full exercise of their rights.” Id. art. 59.
210. Id. (establishing the right to express religious beliefs); Id. art. 61 (granting the right to
expression in one’s “freedom of conscience”). Soto finds that Articles 57 and 58 establish “five
basic rights related to freedom of expression. These five guarantees can be summarized as
follows: (i) the right to freely express thoughts, (ii) the right to communicate or obtain
information, (iii) the right to establish and develop communicational media, (iv) the right to
receive timely, truthful, and impartial information without censorship, and (v) the right to reply to
adverse information expressed against oneself.” The existence of rights, however, does not mean
these rights are absolute. Soto, supra note 24, at 413.
211. Constitution, supra note 54, art. 58.
212. LEY RESORTE, supra note 48. Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión
[Social Responsibility on Radio and Television Act], La Gaceta Oficial N° 38.081 [Official
Gazette No. 38.081] art. 6(2) (Dec. 7, 2004) (Venez.).

2013]

Balancing Regulation and Rights

307

(ICCPR), both of which call for balance.213 The 1999 Constitution
confers preeminent legal status upon such “conventions relating human
rights.”214 As an example, the ACHR expressly establishes the “right to
freedom of thought and expression.”215 This right is balanced alongside
other integral concerns. While the right “shall not be subject to prior
censorship, [the exercise of the right] shall be subject to subsequent
imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to
the extent necessary to ensure” adherence to enumerated categories.216
These categories include “the protection of national security”217 and the
“moral protection of childhood and adolescence,”218 the chief objectives
utilized in the Chávez government’s argument for the use of
regulations.219
Likewise, the ICCPR upholds every person’s “right to freedom of
expression.”220 This right is qualified, however, by “special duties and
responsibilities.”221 The ICCPR identifies the preservation of national
security as one permissible justification for legal regulations.222 On the
whole, the nuanced approach of both Conventions, like other
213. Venezuela became a signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights in
November 1969. See generally Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Organización de
los Estados Americanos [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of
American States], Informe Annual de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechoes Humanos 1977
[Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1977] (1978), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/77sp/sec.1.htm [hereinafter American Convention on Human
Rights]. Venezuela signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in June 1969
and ratified it in May 1978. See U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html (last visited Nov.
30, 2010).
214. “The treaties, pacts and conventions relating human rights which have been executed
and ratified by Venezuela have a constitutional rank, and prevail over internal legislation, insofar
as they contain provisions concerning the enjoyment and exercise of such rights that are more
favorable than those established by this Constitution amid the laws of the Republic, and shall be
immediately and directly applied by the courts and other organs of the Public Power.”
Constitution, supra note 54, art. 23
215. “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s
choice.” American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 213, art. 13(1).
216. Id. art. 13(2).
217. Id. art. 13(2)(b) (“the protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals”).
218. Id. art. 13(4) (“[P]ublic entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the
sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and
adolescence.”). See also Soto, supra note 24, at 414 (discussing this provision of the Convention).
219. See supra Part II.
220. “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 213, art. 19, ¶ 2.
221. Id. art. 19, ¶ 3.
222. Id. art. 19, ¶ 2-3 (“For the protection of national security or of public order (order
public), or of public health or morals.”).
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international law, recognizes both rights and reasonable regulation.
Moreover, the opposition media’s desire to protect rights should be
balanced with the Chávez government’s desire to establish regulations,
as Venezuelan and international law support both positions.
Looking forward, balancing the conflicting positions in the media
war will best uphold political pluralism and advance the public interest
if each side operates reasonably.223 Moderation in both reporting and
regulating will encourage and aid in balancing.224 Journalists225 and
Venezuelans alike226 desire impartiality and de-politicization in the
news.227 The government, opposition, and media should work towards a
more active and informed society that is distanced from political
polarization.228 These necessary governmental regulations should be
carefully crafted so as to not arbitrarily or excessively threaten rights.229
The Chávez administration,230 opposition members,231 and other
223. See supra Part IV(A) (advocating for political pluralism rather than the exclusion of one
side in the media war).
224. Although some politicization is likely to remain a major factor in the media war,
increased neutrality in both reporting and regulating will benefit the debate. Additionally,
regulations should restrain government sources, not only privately owned opposition sources.
225. Most journalists, who would be most effective free of politic influence, “are caught in
the crossfire between media owners and the government.” CANNON, supra note 29, at 130.
226. “Venezuelans would welcome some sort of non-political controls on all sectors of the
media industry to ensure greater impartiality and balance in reporting.” Venezuela’s Media War,
supra note 21. “The public [has] come to understand only too well the dangers of distortion.” Id.
227. Potential solutions that could enhance the agenda setting, watchdog, and gatekeeper
functions of press include public access laws, more resources and enforcement, and better
journalism training. Waisbord, supra note 145, at 383.
228. In considering the media’s rights and responsibilities, it may be helpful to consider the
“long-held position that the national media . . . bore a public obligation to serve the national good
and to work in cooperation with the government to improve social conditions.” PRESS
REFERENCE, supra note 13, at 7. “Venezuela’s media, including state TV, needs tough controls to
ensure diversity, balance and access, enforced at arms’ length from political powers.” Klein,
supra note 39. This may require “a broader effort to ‘democratize the media’ so that it reflects
viewpoints that were largely excluded from the commercial media in the past.” HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 57, at 64.
229. “[U]nder international norms on freedom of expression, broadcasting regulations must
be precisely defined in order to avoid overbroad or arbitrary interpretation by officials that
constrain free expression and the public’s access to information and opinion.” Id. at 64–65.
Human Rights Watch maintains that phrases like “integral education of the children” may be
overbroad and could infringe upon freedom of speech. Id.
230. More than 60 television stations and 250 grassroots radio and print operations have been
established since Chávez came to power in 1999. Tamara Pearson, The People Legislate:
Grassroots Media Movement Creates Its Own Law, VENEZUELANALYSIS (June 24, 2010),
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6297. See also WILPERT, supra note 30, at 187 (Community
outlets “have been sprouting up throughout the country in recent years, are acting as a catalyst,
spreading the word about what changes are still needed and also educating people in the poor
neighborhoods about what changes are being made and how they can get involved.”).
231. See Carolina García Aparicio, MUD Presenta Propuestas Para Proyecto de Ley de
Medios Comunitarios, EL NACIONAL (Aug. 10, 2011),
http://www.el-nacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/227911/Nación/MUD-presentapropuestas-para-contrucción-de-proyecto-de-Ley-de-medios-comuntarios (Venez.) (draft law for
community media from opposition coalition).
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Venezuelans232 have already envisioned and implemented some
community-based media reforms well-suited to the balancing
framework. Further implementation of people-controlled grassroots and
community-based media would be ideal.233
The balancing framework is especially useful when applied to the
expansion of novel media forms. In fact, the nature of the Internet may
necessitate balancing while providing a unique outlet for popular
participation.234 The use of social media networks by the Venezuelan
people, government, and opposition exploded in recent years.235 The
individual-driven nature of the Internet makes it an ideal outlet for
pursuing the goals of the people, as it allows for an equal opportunity to
broadcast and express ideas. Additionally, increased peer-to-peer
communication is essential to the new socialism.236 The balancing
analysis can be used as the government creates new regulations.237 In
connection with the expansion of news on the Internet, the impending
likelihood of globalization encourages better development of a strong
Venezuela-based media.238
In conclusion, the Venezuelan media war should be analyzed
according to a balancing analysis. Shared domestic and international
232. For example, a group of people recently proposed a new legal framework for regulating
grassroots media, encompassing aspects, which include licensing, sustainability, and organizing.
See Pearson, supra note 230. Participants cited the need for media “that doesn’t see news and
information as something that is bought and sold,” along with observing that “[t]hose who control
the media, control culture.”
233. See WILPERT, supra note 30, at 24.
234. See Aliana Gonzalez, Power in the Hands of Citizen Participation, EL UNIVERSAL (May
16, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/05/16/power-in-the-hands-of-citizenparticipation.shtml (discussing rapidly changing communication and the people’s increased
control over journalism).
235. See Hugo Chávez Frias on Twitter, http://twitter.com/#!/Chávezcandanga (last visited
Nov. 22, 2011); Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32 (“I think as Venezuelans have learned to
be more discerning, to inform ourselves by taking on the role of investigator through social media
networks such as twitter and facebook so as to keep ourselves informed in light of the serious
lack of information regarding the different difficulties our country is facing.”); Rafael Rodriguez,
Venezuelans Followed Opposition Debate Through Social Networks, EL UNIVERSAL (Nov. 16,
2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/111116/venezuelansfollowed-opposition-debate-through-social-networks (noting Venezuelan’s high usage of social
networking, including during opposition political debates).
236. See WILPERT, supra note 30, at 224.
237. A newly amended version of RESORTE adds Internet media regulation to television and
radio controls. See International Media Dep’t. – MINCI, Reform of the Social Responsibility in
Media Law: 4 Questions & 4 Answers, VENEZUELANALYSIS (Jan. 5, 2011),
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5914. See also B.B.C. Mundo, El Mapa de la Censura en
Internet y la Guerra de los Pagos, B.B.C. MUNDO (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2011/02/110217_1421_breves_tecnologia_opennet_interne
t_apple_google_dc.shtml (showing that no Internet censorship is currently taking place in
Venezuela).
238. Except for Grupo Cisneros, so far “globalization of the media appears to have bypassed
Venezuela altogether.” While corporations including Sony and HBO have Caracas officers, they
are largely separate from local media. Besides Cisneros, there is little to no foreign investment in
Venezuela’s media. Mayobre, supra note 26, at 182–83.
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law principles commit to a balance between rights and regulation.
Reasonable regulations consistent with Venezuela’s legal framework
should be accomplished without eliminating citizens’ freedoms of
expression and information. In addition, proponents of each position in
the media war should strive to act reasonably. The combination of a
balanced approach to the media war and attempts to improve the quality
of public debate will prioritize the Venezuelan people, promote political
pluralism, and allow both positions to “win” the media war.
C. Balance and the Violent Photograph Ban
Finally, this part applies the balance approach to the violent photo
ban in order to exemplify this approach’s superiority. Freedom to
publish images subject to reasonable regulation promotes the most
favorable results for the government, privately owned opposition media,
and the Venezuelan people. Rather than simply focusing on whether this
particular ban was reasonable, however, it must be considered in the
greater political and social context.
Accounting for each position’s argument, the violent photograph
ban could be classified as either a reasonable regulation or a threat to
rights. The government maintained the position that the ban was a
necessary regulation to uphold the dual objectives of protecting children
and preserving national security.239 On one hand, allowing the privately
owned opposition media to gratuitously publish gruesome images could
harm children and national security. On the other hand, privately owned
opposition media and international organizations portrayed the ban as a
threat to rights.240 Allowing the Venezuelan government free rein to
regulate which photographs are published by the media could lead to
unjustifiable censorship and the infringement of freedoms of expression
and information. Each side presents realistic concerns about the other.
Allowing either side to prevail by concluding that one position has a
superior ban-related argument could lead to problematic and
unsatisfactory outcomes for society.241 By giving credence to each
position, while prioritizing the public good, a balancing analysis is the
best approach to the ban.
The violent photo ban should be considered in the greater political
239. See supra Part II (discussing these two stated government objectives). The government
could make basic arguments alleging the ban’s reasonableness. Even in its original form, the ban
was only for the next 30 days. It was further restricted as a punitive measure for the two papers
which had published the photo. The ban only targeted gruesome photos like the one originally
published.
240. See supra Part III (discussing other actions against the press and potential threats to
freedom of expression and information). The opposition could argue that banning photographs for
the next 30 days essentially restricted publishing until the September 26 elections. In addition, the
ban could force self-censorship by the media.
241. See Part IV(a) (proposing that favoring one side to the exclusion of the other would
damage political pluralism and therefore the public good).
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context. Both the publishing of the photo and the court decision
coincided with upcoming legislative elections, which took place on
September 26, 2010, about a month after the ban was declared.242 The
elections were a threat to Chávez’ immediate power over the National
Assembly, as well as an early indicator of the 2012 presidential
election.243 They were also an opportunity for the political opposition to
gain greater political power and momentum.244 While the government
claimed that the photograph published in El Nacional and Tal Cual was
an effort to gain voters before the election,245 the opposition and
international critics claimed that the resulting ban was an effort to
silence the media and shield itself before the election.246 Both claims
against the opposing side involved underlying political motivation.247
The opposition argued that it was simply educating the citizenry about
the reality of violence in the nation, while the government argued that it
was protecting children and preserving national security.248 Both stated
rationales were supported by factors other than political motivation.
Nevertheless, the political context is a relevant factor in assessing the
ban.
Even while considering the politicized nature of the debate over
the photo ban, important underlying social issues are easily overlooked.
A balanced analysis accounts for factors such as medium249 and
emotional impact,250 including the particularly visceral impact of the
photograph and the newspapers in which it was published. Nevertheless,
the focus extends beyond the photograph itself. The photograph ban,
albeit indicative of a greater war between the government and privately
owned opposition media, is most meaningful in the context of the social
and economic situation in Venezuela.251
242. Romero, supra note 170.
243. Id.
244. Id. Examples of significant legislative control include the ability to block legislation and
choose Supreme Court officials.
245. See Venezuela Ban on Violent Images Fuels Censorship Row, supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
247. See Molinski, supra note 2.
248. Id.
249. On symbolic speech, see James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from
Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2008). See also ELLNER, supra note 33, at 129. Photographs
may be especially significant for the opposition, as they provide a clear and unified message that
the opposition struggles with rhetorically. Id. at 131.
250. See Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, Staring Death in the Face During Times of War:
When Ethics, Law, and Self-Censorship in the News Media Hide the Morbidity of Authenticity, 25
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 87 (2011) (focusing upon wartime need for images and
suggests using internet to post questionable images. “Photos are trickier than words, because their
content is in large measure emotional, visceral, and because you can’t edit their content.”); Clay
Calvert, Voyeur War? The First Amendment, Privacy and Images from the War on Terrorism, 15
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 147 (2004).
251. See supra notes 120–136 and accompanying text.
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Public debate should focus on the greater societal issues
represented by the photograph of dead bodies at the morgue.252 The
newspapers published the photograph as a protest to the violence
plaguing Venezuela, and the government’s reaction acknowledged the
existence of social unrest. Nevertheless, the ban became one narrow
battle in a broader media war. By focusing on such narrow battles, both
positions allow their conflict to override healthy public debate on the
issues. While media freedoms and the government’s need for regulation
must both be respected, considerations of the public good must define
the balance of these conflicting forces. Thus, pluralism would best be
served by a truly public discussion of the societal issues presented by
the photograph.253 Instead of escalating polarization, the media and
government should provide public forums with a view towards creating
mutually beneficial solutions for the people.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Article proposes the novel use of a balancing
approach in analyzing the relative roles of media regulation and rights
protection. During Chávez’s fourteen years in office, numerous
domestic and international voices stressed the conflicts between media
regulation and freedoms of expression and information. Moreover, most
theoretical media models entail choosing between regulation and rights.
This article recommends reconciling the government and opposition
media positions in Venezuela’s media war through use of a new
theoretical framework that balances reasonable regulation and rights
protection. As the violent photo ban demonstrates, both the Chávez
government and privately owned opposition media presented
meaningful arguments, however, neither position should prevail to the
exclusion of the other. A theoretical balancing framework allows for
both reasonable regulation and rights protection. Instead of escalating
the media war, balance encourages both positions to focus upon the
public good. As Venezuela begins a new era without Chávez, this
approach should be used in that nation and others to assess and
reconcile government regulation and rights protections.

252. See Romero, supra note 2 (“Given the government’s stance in these cases, many here
worry it is focusing on the messenger, not the underlying message.”).
253. See, e.g., Golinger, supra note 36 (Journalist Alberto Nolia, who often criticized
political opposition to Chávez, suggested that “children are not stupid, they know what’s going
on. Perhaps it would be better to publish images of people killed by violent crime with
explanations about who they were and the fact that now their lives are over, so that kids will
understand the severity of delinquency . . . the problem of crime in Venezuela is very serious.”).

